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The rehabilitation of a financially distressed business often requires ad-
justing both its finances and its operations. Through Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,' bankruptcy law provides a tool for financial restructuring and
an opportunity for operational restructuring. To be sure, bankruptcy law
alone is not a cure-all for a business with a broken business model. For many
distressed businesses, however, bankruptcy relief offers an opportunity to
address both financial and operational problems.2 A struggling airline that
files for bankruptcy may, for example, seek to renegotiate its debt obliga-
tions as well as to restructure its flight network.3 A national chain of retail
stores might seek to use bankruptcy to renegotiate with bondholders and to
close unprofitable stores.4 Operational and financial restructuring often go
hand-in-hand, as debt renegotiation may involve changes to the debt-
or's ownership structure and corporate governance.' And bankruptcy law,
* Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. My thanks to Charlton Cope-
land, Pamela Foohey, Patrick Gudridge, Melissa Jacoby, Eric Madiar, Troy McKenzie, Juliet
Moringiello, Christopher Odinet, Chrystin Ondersma, Samir Parikh, Stephen Schnably, and
William H. Widen for comments and conversations on this and prior drafts. In addition, I owe
thanks to the participants at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2014 conference, the
ABI's Junior Bankruptcy Scholars Workshop at the Brooklyn Law School, and the Saint
Thomas University Developing Ideas Workshop conferences.
'11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (2012).
2 See Adam J. Levitin, Bankrupt Politics and the Politics of Bankruptcy, 97 CORNELL L.
REv. 1399, 1445 (2012) ("If a firm's business is the sale of whale oil, corset stays, bustles,
flash bulbs, slide rules, floppy disks, cassette tapes, 8-tracks, or books or CDs in a brick-and-
mortar store, bankruptcy cannot help it beyond providing an orderly way to redeploy its assets
and giving it a dignified funeral."). Of course, who should determine whether the business is
viable and when that determination should happen are matters of serious, longstanding dis-
putes. See, e.g., Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter II: A
Challenge to the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 604-05 (2009) (noting and challenging the
many criticisms of Chapter 11 as an inefficient tool for weeding out non-viable businesses
from the reorganization process).
See, e.g., Evan Perez & Susan Carey, Delta, Northwest See Bankruptcy as Key to Revi-
val, WALL ST. J. (Sep. 15, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl12671083630940483
(describing the operational changes Delta proposed as part of its bankruptcy restructuring,
including efforts to reconfigure its network and fleet organization).
4 See, e.g., Ezequiel Minaya, American Apparel Emerges from Bankruptcy Proceedings,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/american-apparel-emerges-from-
bankruptcy-proceedings-1454714839 (describing part of the reorganization effort as address-
ing the chain's outsized "store footprint").
' See id. (detailing the change in ownership and corporate structure as the debtor retailer
swapped old debts for new equity and converted to a Delaware limited liability corporation);
see also Rachel Feintzeig, Sbarro Closer to Bankruptcy Exit, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052970203499704576624922724044108 (describing
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at least as applied to business entities, can facilitate this dual restructur-
ing.6
Financially distressed municipalities likewise often require both finan-
cial and operational restructuring. For example, a municipality may need to
renegotiate its bond debt (financial restructuring) and to scale back the ser-
vices it provides residents (operational restructuring). Municipalities, how-
ever, have a different set of tools available to them than would a corporation.
A municipality may seek bankruptcy relief under Chapter 9 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. This route is available only if the state authorizes it-and, at
this point, only twenty-seven states have passed bankruptcy authorization
laws.7 States may also seek to address municipal distress through state finan-
cial rescue laws, whether or not they have authorized access to Chapter 9.
In contrast to the way Chapter 11 facilitates both financial and opera-
tional restructuring, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code formally treats finan-
cial and operational restructuring as separate and independent exercises.'
Federal bankruptcy law governs financial restructuring; state law governs
operational restructuring. Thus, renegotiating bond debt falls within the
realm of federal bankruptcy law; scaling back on city services falls within
the realm of state law. This divide between debt matters (financial restructur-
ing) and governance matters (operational restructuring) is understood to re-
flect the unique sovereignty issues that arise in municipal insolvency.9 While
the power to adjust financial obligations is squarely within Congress's power
to "enact uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies,"0 the states retain the
power to govern their municipalities."
This debt-governance dichotomy is firmly entrenched in our under-
standing of municipal bankruptcy federalism, and it is baked into the statu-
tory structure of the municipal bankruptcy laws under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code.12 This dichotomy is also one of the fundamental bases for
the debt-for-equity swap at the heart of the retail pizza chain's reorganization plan, under
which first-lien holders received one hundred percent of the equity in the restructured entity).
' See Clayton P. Gillette & David A. Skeel, Jr., Governance Reform and the Judicial Role
in Municipal Bankruptcy, 125 YALE L.J. 1150, 1162 (2016) ("Corporate debtors regularly take
advantage of the reorganization process to reshape their governance as well as to restructure
their debt.").
PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, THE STATE ROLE IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL Dis-
TRESS 12 (July 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2013/07/23/PewStateRole
inLocalGovernmentFinancialDistress.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN92-EWWV].
8 While Chapter 9 provides a means to impose a "plan of adjustment" on non-consenting
creditors, it specifically reserves for states the power to control the bankruptcy municipality's
political and governmental functions. 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (2012) (discussed in more detail
infra Part I).
' See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1166 (noting that the bankruptcy laws "suggest
congressional concern with constitutional limitations on federal diminution of state sover-
eignty in Chapter 9 proceedings").
10 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have Power to ... establish . ..
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... ).
" See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1166 (noting that this is the dominant descriptive
account of municipal bankruptcy, but challenging the assumption that the Constitution requires
such a structure and arguing that this divide is inefficient).
12 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012). See discussion of statutory structure infra Part I.C.
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much of the criticism of the municipal bankruptcy laws, both in legal
academia and in policy circles. Under this model of debt and governance,
Chapter 9 only addresses a city's financial problems without addressing the
causes of those problems." While financial distress may result from exoge-
nous shocks, it frequently results from poor governance. Local government
officials may face political and/or structural obstacles to address financial
distress, such as raising taxes or scaling back services. Chapter 9 is an inef-
fective tool, it has been argued, because it fails to address these rbot causes.14
These criticisms have appeared in policy circles as well, most recently
in the opposition to any form of bankruptcy relief for Atlantic City, New
Jersey," and for Puerto Rico.16
Unfortunately, though, this debt-governance divide is frequently ap-
plied in a highly formalistic way that fails as both a descriptive and prescrip-
tive model of municipal bankruptcy federalism.7 Such a model, referred to
here as the Great Divide Model, assumes that debt and governance are com-
pletely separate matters. The role of a court in determining the limits of
federal bankruptcy power in this context is simply to determine whether the
matter in question is one of debt or governance. Debt matters fall in the
federal sphere of power, governance in that of the states. The Great Divide
Model rests on two basic assumptions of municipal bankruptcy federalism:
" See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 2, at 1438 (noting the recidivism problem as a conse-
quence of municipal bankruptcy law's non-interference with operational reorganization); Clay-
ton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy,
79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 320 (2012) [hereinafter Gillette, Fiscal Federalism] ("Since § 904 of
the Bankruptcy Code allows local officials to maintain control of taxing and spending deci-
sions during bankruptcy, officials may believe that bankruptcy insulates them from the imposi-
tion of obligations that they find politically, if not financially, imprudent."); Omer Kimhi,
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG.
351, 359 (2010).
1 Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 13, at 320. Gillette's concern is actually more
acute, as he argues Chapter 9 may further insulate officials from these difficult decisions.
" See, e.g., Stephen M. Sweeney, Taking Over Atlantic City's Finances is Better than
Bankruptcy, NJ.com (Jan. 17, 2016), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/01/sweeney-
taking- over -atlantic citys.finances is bet.html [https://perma.cc/B9CM-SS93] (comments
of Stephen M. Sweeny, President of the New Jersey Senate, regarding financial options for
Atlantic City: "Reorganization of the city's finances under a state takeover would enable the
city's various stakeholders, including city officials, community groups, churches, and county
and state leaders, to work together to turn around the city-which would not be possible under
the supervision of a federal bankruptcy judge.").
" See, e.g., Kasia Klimasinka, House Works on Puerto Plan That Faces Skepticism in
Senate, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-01-25/
house-works-on-puerto-rico-plan-that-faces-skepticism-in-senate [https://perma.cc/279H-
TXPC] (quoting Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa: "The feeling is if we just did a straight
Chapter 9, we'd be right back here in five or six years doing it again.").
" "Formalism" here is used as describing the courts' rule-driven approach to addressing
whether a particular power belongs in the federal or state regulatory sphere, not in its meaning
in separation of powers law. While "formalism" is a defined term of art in separation of
powers law, in which powers are explicitly allocated among the three branches of government
and the role of courts is to classify the power exercised is being exercised by the appropriate
branch in the appropriate way, see M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in
Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 608 (2001), this article will not address
separation of powers issues.
2017] 33
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(1) that Congress has the exclusive power to pass bankruptcy laws; and (2)
that there is a clean divide between debt and governance.
This article argues that it is necessary to move away from this model of
federalism and toward a more functional approach-an approach that recog-
nizes the purpose of federal municipal bankruptcy laws as a means to ad-
dress municipal insolvency when state law alone proves inadequate. Without
a functional understanding of municipal insolvency federalism, federal bank-
ruptcy law may intrude upon state sovereignty in this context, both when
states have authorized the use of federal bankruptcy laws and when they
have not.
The recent municipal insolvency crisis has highlighted the need for
moving beyond the Great Divide Model. As more municipalities are sinking
into financial distress, weighed down in large part by unsustainable legacy
costs,'" there have been an unprecedented number of municipal bankruptcy
filings.19 At the same time, states have increasingly sought to address munic-
ipal debt problems without bankruptcy relief.20 The concomitant increase in
both municipal bankruptcy filings and state rescue laws creates more occa-
sions for conflict and uncertainty about the interaction of federal and state
law in this field. The Great Divide Model provides little guidance in how
such conflicts should be addressed-if matters can be characterized as finan-
cial, they fall within the sphere of the bankruptcy laws; if operational, they
fall within that of state laws. Since many matters have elements of each, this
test is of little help.
When states have authorized municipalities to seek bankruptcy relief,
the Great Divide Model has failed to provide a workable framework for
analyzing the limits of federal power as applied to matters that fall within the
overlapping region between debt and governance. The most prominent issue
'" See, e.g., PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, A WIDENING GAP IN CITIES: SHORTFALLS IN FUND-
INC FOR PENSIONS AND RETIREE HEALTH CARE 2 (Jan. 2013) (reporting that the largest sixty-
one cities in the United States had pension shortfalls of ninety-nine billion dollars in fiscal year
2009, a number which increased fifteen percent among the forty reporting cities in 2010),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/mediallegacy/uploadedfiles/pcs-assets/2013/pewcitypensionsre-
portpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/SR3N-9FRB]; Matthew J. Belvedere, If Detroit Cuts Pensions,
Will Your City be Next?, CNBC (July 29, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100920940 [https://
perma.cc/HDQ7-N4DA]; Charles Krauthammer, If Detroit Bankruptcy Succeeds, Other Cities
Will Follow, MYSA (July 26, 2013), http://www.mysanantonio.com/opinion/commentary/arti-
cle/If-Detroit-bankruptcy-succeeds-other-cities-will-4689541.php [https://perma.cc/CX2S-
Z37F]; Monica Davey et al., Detroit Ruling on Bankruptcy Lifts Pension Protections, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/us/detroit-bankruptcy-ruling.html
[https://perma.cc/V99P-UYUX] (noting that the outcome in Detroit "is likely to resonate in
Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and many other American cities where the rising cost of
pensions has been crowding out spending for public schools, police departments and other
services.").
" See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1183 (noting that until recently there had been
few municipal bankruptcy cases); see also Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities,
123 YALE L.J. 1118, 1130 (2014) (counting twenty-eight urban municipalities that either
sought bankruptcy protection or entered a state receivership program between 2007-2013).
20 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 19; PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7; Clayton P.
Gillette, Dictatorships for Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities, 114 COLUM. L.
REV. 1373, 1377 (2014).
34 [Vol. 11
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that falls in this gray area is that of municipal pension obligations. These
obligations are partially financial in character and partially operational, as
they are a core platform of the city's relationship with its employees. Can a
municipality use bankruptcy law to adjust pension obligations, or are such
obligations within the state's power to control municipal governance?
Taking a formalist approach, the Great Divide Model categorizes pen-
sion obligations as falling within either the sphere of financial restructuring
or operational restructuring. This model ultimately obscures the legal analy-
sis courts have actually used in handling matters such as pensions that fall in
this gray area where debt and governance overlap.21 For example, as illus-
trated infra in Detroit's bankruptcy, despite using formalist language, the
court's analysis actually reflects a more nuanced balancing of federal and
state interests in the treatment of employee and retiree claims.22 And by ob-
scuring this legal analysis, the Great Divide Model fails to provide an analyt-
ical framework to consider the limits of the municipal bankruptcy laws more
broadly. Scholars have long understood that the municipal bankruptcy laws
provide indirect means for courts to interfere with local governance even
though courts cannot directly mandate operational reforms.23 That is, be-
cause the line between debt and governance is an artificial one, courts could
conceivably demand governance reform under the guise of debt reform. For
example, can a court use its power to deny plan confirmation as a "stick" to
force the debtor to undergo operational changes? Recent bankruptcy cases
illustrate that this indirect control may be occurring to an even greater extent
than previously contemplated.24 The Great Divide Model's formalist division
between debt and governance opens the door for such indirect federal con-
trol, without taking into consideration broader principles of municipal bank-
ruptcy federalism.
When states have sought to address municipal insolvency without
resorting to federal bankruptcy relief, the Great Divide Model of municipal
bankruptcy has also threatened to disrupt state control over distressed mu-
nicipalities. Some state financial rescue laws have been invalidated for con-
flicting with the Bankruptcy Clause and with Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code, as they arguably intrude upon Congress's exclusive right to pass bank-
ruptcy laws. This approach was first articulated in dicta in a Sixth Circuit per
2' See Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 513-14 (1988) (describing "one
view of the vice of formalism" is that it may "disguise a choice in the language of definitional
inexorability," and thus "obscures that choice and thus obstructs questions of how it was made
and whether it could have been made differently").
22 See infra Part II.B.
21 See Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual
Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 474 (1993) (describing the
potential for "judicial control by a wink and a nod" by refusing to confirm a city's debt adjust-
ment plan).
24 See Melissa B. Jacoby, Federalism Form and Function in the Detroit Bankruptcy, 33
YALE J. ON REG. 55 (2016) (outlining the "Detroit Blueprint," whereby the court was able to
use a variety of means-from case management, mediation, and other procedural devices-
that can expand the judicial role in municipal bankruptcy cases).
Harvard Law & Policy Review
curiam opinion.25 The Supreme Court, however, gave it a significant boost in
its recent opinion on Puerto Rico's efforts to restructure its debts outside of
bankruptcy law.26 In that case, the Court held that Chapter 9 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code preempts Puerto Rico's Recovery Act even though Puerto Rican
municipalities are ineligible for bankruptcy relief, reasoning that Chapter 9
preempts all state municipal bankruptcy laws, even as to states that have not
opted into the municipal bankruptcy laws.27
In arguing for this shift toward a functional approach, this article is not
the first to criticize the Great Divide Model's formalism. To be sure, academ-
ics have long poked holes in this model, noting that the statutory "wall"
between debt and governance is actually quite permeable in practice.28 Bank-
ruptcy courts can influence governance matters through the confirmation re-
quirements, as Michael McConnell and Randal Picker first noted a quarter-
century ago.29 Melissa Jacoby's work on Detroit's bankruptcy has illustrated
how courts can influence governance matters more subtly, and perhaps more
pervasively, through case management strategies designed to encourage
settlements.3 0
Scholars have also taken some preliminary steps toward a theoretical
justification for this permeability. Juliet Moringiello has argued for a cooper-
ative model of municipal bankruptcy in which the municipal bankruptcy
laws are intended to be supplemented by state law participation." Clayton
Gillette and David Skeel have argued that the Constitution itself does not
mandate a strict debt-governance distinction i federal bankruptcy law and
that bankruptcy law might be improved by giving courts a greater role in
operational restructuring.32 And Samir Parikh has argued that the Contracts
Clause leaves more debt-adjustment power to the states than is generally
recognized, thus challenging the assumption that federal law provides the
exclusive means for debt adjustment."
Nonetheless, the debt-governance dichotomy still forms the foundation
of much academic literature on this subject and underlies most critiques of
25 Pontiac Retired Emps.' Ass'n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2014) (per
curiam).
26 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1939, 1947 (2016).
27 Id.
21 See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 23, at 474 (arguing that courts could use the
best interests test o indirectly force operational changes).
29 Id.
30 Jacoby, supra note 24.
' Juliet M. Moringiello, Goals and Governance in Municipal Bankruptcy, 71 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 403, 480-81 (2014) (arguing that he municipal bankruptcy laws were deliber-
ately structured in order to invite state law participation in the bankruptcy proceedings).
32 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1153.
* Samir Parikh, A New Fulcrum Point for City Survival, 57 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 221
(2015) (arguing that states are best positioned to rehabilitate distressed municipalities, but
recognizing that municipal bankruptcy law-even if never invoked-is a key component of
any municipal rehabilitation effort); id. at 262 ("I argue that the Contracts Clause, as it appears
in the Constitution and various state constitutions, has been widely misunderstood. In fact, by
utilizing carefully tailored, temporary contractual modifications, distressed municipalities have
far more leverage and bargaining power than they likely suspect.").
36 [Vol. 11
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Chapter 9.34 McConnell and Picker concluded that Chapter 9 "serves little
use: it does little to address city problems and . . . even impedes the ability of
states to institute superior schemes for dealing with cities that have gone
broke." 35 Omer Kimhi has argued that distressed municipalities "need ... a
more pervasive and in-depth recovery process-a process that the Bank-
ruptcy Code, at least in its current form, does not contain."36 Gillette has
argued that the debt-governance divide, i.e., the inability of bankruptcy
courts "to impose resource adjustments," is the source of cities' ability to
engage in strategic use of bankruptcy.37 And Adam Levitin has argued that
the lack of authority to order operational restructuring may lead to recidi-
vism problems, as municipalities may end up emerging from bankruptcy just
as unhealthy as they entered.3 8
This article proposes a decisive break with Great Divide Model as a
foundation for understanding municipal bankruptcy law. Instead of presum-
ing the existence of two separate spheres of federal and state power, it pro-
poses a thoroughly functional approach that fully recognizes the significant
overlap between debt and governance and finds room for regulatory overlap
to accommodate it. It proposes an approach in which both federal and state
law work together through the bankruptcy process while still respecting fed-
eral supremacy. Such an approach is consistent with the history and structure
of the municipal bankruptcy laws, which have been fashioned with an eye to
provide limited federal relief to states without interfering with governmental
functions. This approach also helps to frame municipal bankruptcy federal-
ism questions in a way that more directly and transparently addresses the
state sovereignty concerns that arise in this context. Namely, it creates a
framework for analyzing the limits of the federal bankruptcy power, and it
ensures a space for state law to coexist with federal bankruptcy law.
Accordingly, Part I begins with a description of municipal bankruptcy
law, highlighting the dual and, at times, overlapping roles of federal and
state law that distinguish municipal bankruptcy federalism from general
bankruptcy federalism. Although the municipal bankruptcy laws under
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code are very similar to the corporate reorgani-
zation laws under Chapter 11, Chapter 9 reflects sovereignty concerns that
are unique to municipal bankruptcy.39 These concerns are reflected through-
out Chapter 9, from how a municipal bankruptcy case may be commenced to
how it may be concluded through a debt adjustment plan.40 These provisions
illustrate that the divide between debt and governance is quite porous in
areas, presenting opportunities for "leaks" between the debt-governance
3 See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 2, at 1438 (noting the recidivism problem as a conse-
quence of municipal bankruptcy law's non-interference with operational reorganization); Gil-
lette, supra note 13; Kimhi, supra note 13, at 359.
" McConnell & Picker, supra note 23, at 494.
6 Kimhi, supra note 13, at 385.
* Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 13, at 325.
* Levitin, supra note 2, at 1438.
' See infra Part I.
40 See infra Part I.
2017] 37
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divide: federal courts may indirectly require operational changes to bankrupt
municipalities, and state law may indirectly shape distributional priorities.
Part II describes the dominant Great Divide Model of municipal bank-
ruptcy federalism. Debt and governance are treated as independent separate
spheres, with federal law exercising a monopoly power over debt adjustment
and state law over operational adjustments. This approach has been apparent
both in bankruptcy cases and in challenges to state financial rescue laws.
This part of the article concludes with two bankruptcy case studies and two
case studies of challenges to non-bankruptcy restructuring attempts, includ-
ing the Court's recent ruling regarding Puerto Rico's public debt restructur-
ing law.4 1
Part III identifies and challenges the two key assumptions underlying
the Great Divide Model: namely, that Congress has the exclusive power to
pass bankruptcy laws and that there exists a clean divide between debt and
governance. Although these general principles can provide a useful heuristic
for characterizing the municipal bankruptcy laws, neither is entirely accu-
rate. As argued in this part, the Court has never found that the constitutional
power to pass "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies" gave Con-
gress the exclusive power to pass bankruptcy laws.42 The uniformity require-
ment does much less work than that, resulting in a bankruptcy system that is
decidedly non-uniform in some important ways-in particular, as applied to
insolvent municipalities.43 In addition, debt and governance matters fre-
quently overlap, placing stress on this formal categorical distinction. The
existence of these overlapping regions requires an analysis of the limits of
Congress's power in the field of municipal insolvency-an analysis that is
obscured by the Great Divide Model.
Part IV presents a more functional approach to analyzing these munici-
pal bankruptcy federalism questions. This approach recognizes that Congress
and the states share responsibility for insolvency regulation, albeit subject o
federal preemption. It also recognizes that federal adjustment of debts will
likely intrude upon matters of governance and vice versa. This approach is
consistent with the history and development of the municipal bankruptcy
laws, and it better captures the way courts have sought to balance federal
and state interests in municipal bankruptcy cases. This functional approach
further provides a more useful framework in considering the limits of federal
intrusion into municipal governance.
Part IV also discusses the role this functional approach can take in con-
necting municipal bankruptcy federalism with broader conversations of "our
federalism(s)."" The Great Divide Model's formalist approach reflects the
"dual federalism" model that dominated Tenth Amendment analysis in the
41 Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1939 (2016).
42 See infra Part III.
43 See Lawrence Ponoroff, Constitutional Limitations on State-Enacted Bankruptcy Ex-
emption Legislation and the Long Overdue Case for Uniformity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 353
(2014).
" Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549 (2012).
38 [Vol. 11I
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beginning of the twentieth century-the time period when the first munici-
pal bankruptcy laws were first drafted and interpreted by the Court. In that
way, municipal bankruptcy federalism is out of sync with modem federalism
theories and jurisprudence. Drawing from some modem federalism theories
may shed light on the limits of federal interference into the governance of
insolvent municipalities.
I. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY BACKGROUND
This part explains how municipal bankruptcy law raises important is-
sues of federal-state relations. While these issues share some characteristics
with general bankruptcy federalism, this part highlights how the issues in
municipal insolvency are unique in important respects. The municipal bank-
ruptcy laws in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code mirror those of corporate
reorganization laws in Chapter 11 to a large extent, but Chapter 9 has unique
provisions that aim to limit federal intrusion into municipal governance. For
example, municipalities may not file bankruptcy unless authorized to do so
by their state, and once in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy laws leave intact the
state's ability to control the municipality's governmental functions.45 As ana-
lyzed in this part, these provisions reflect the municipal bankruptcy laws as a
mechanism to facilitate federal and state cooperation in the resolution of
municipal insolvency. Unlike questions of preemption, where either federal
or state law will apply, this municipal bankruptcy federalism is not necessa-
rily a zero-sum game-there is room for both federal and state control.
This part begins with a historical description of the municipal bank-
ruptcy laws, which illustrates an enduring tension between efforts to craft a
federal solution to municipal insolvency crises and concerns about the states'
role in controlling their own municipalities. It then explores the statutory
framework that has developed since, illustrating these competing concerns
for a uniform law for restructuring municipalities' debt obligations that also
leaves states in control over operational matters.
A. Brief History of the Origins of Municipal Bankruptcy Law
The federalism concerns underlying the Great Divide Model are long-
standing. They are apparent in the debates leading up to the first municipal
bankruptcy laws, in the text of those first laws, and in the early Supreme
Court decisions examining the constitutionality of those laws. They influ-
enced later amendments to the municipal bankruptcy laws, and they continue
to inform present-day attitudes toward the roles of the federal and state gov-
ernments to address municipal insolvency.46
45 11 U.S.C. §§ 109(c), 903, 904 (2012).
46 See Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 533 (1936) (Car-
dozo, J., dissenting) ("Often the holders of the bonds, to the extent of 90 per cent. [sic] or
more were ready to scale down the obligations and put the debtor on its feet. A recalcitrant
40 Harvard Law & Policy Review [Vol. 11
Congress passed the first municipal bankruptcy laws in the depths of
the Great Depression.47 During that time, many municipalities were strug-
gling to pay their bond obligations, and the states were largely incapable of
providing relief.48 Without a federal bankruptcy option, states faced the diffi-
cult problem of addressing municipal insolvency within the constraints of
the Contracts Clause.49 That clause prohibits states from passing laws that
would impair the obligation of contracts, and bond debts are contractual in
nature.0 This prohibition would bar state laws purporting to discharge al-
ready existing debts, and it might invalidate state laws that would alter the
terms of the debtor obligation, either by reducing the amount of the indebt-
edness (a "debt composition") or by extending the maturity date (an "exten-
sion")." Whether such an alteration would give rise to a constitutional
"impairment" was uncertain (and remains so), meaning that any such at-
tempt was likely to be mired in bondholder litigation.5 2
Against this backdrop, Congress enacted the first municipal bankruptcy
law in 1934.11 It provided a way for municipalities to propose a plan to
adjust their debts and impose the adjustment on all creditors.5 4 The legisla-
minority had capacity to block the plan. Nor was there hope for relief from statutes to be
enacted by the states. The Constitution prohibits the states from passing any law that will
impair the obligation of existing contracts, and a state insolvency act is of no avail as to
obligations of the debtor incurred before its passage. Relief must come from Congress if it is to
come from any one."); Is Chapter 9 Bankruptcy the Ultimate Remedy for Financially Dis-
tressed Municipalities: Are there Better Resolution Mechanisms?: Hearing on H.B. 298,
2015-16 99th Gen. Assemb. 3 (Ill. 2015) (statement of James E. Spiotto) ("The municipal debt
adjustment provisions of the Bankruptcy Act enacted in 1934 thus reflected an attempt to
protect municipalities from debilitating disputes with creditors."), https://www.civicfed.org/
sites/default/files/ames%20Spiotto%2OTestimony%20-%20Subject%2Matter%2Hearing%
20on%20HB298.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6BF-LPJC ].
47 Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934).
4 See Ashton, 298 U.S. at 534 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
49 See id.
'o U.S. CONST., art. I, §10, cl. I ("No State shall ... pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . .").
' See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 194 (1819); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
213, 368-69 (1827) (discussing margins of the Contracts Clause); Ropico, Inc. v. City of New
York, 425 F. Supp. 970, 982 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (analyzing the distinction between "composi-
tions" and "extensions") (discussed infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text); see also
Parikh, supra note 33, at 265 (discussing the evolution of the Contracts Clause jurisprudence).
52 Bills to Amend an Act Entitled "An Act to Establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy
Throughout the United States", Approved July 1, 1898, and Acts Amendatory Thereof and
Supplementary Thereto: Hearings on S. 1868 and H.R. 5950 Before a S. Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 73rd Cong. 13 (1933) [hereinafter Bills to Amend] (statement of Hon. J. Mark
Wilcox) (characterizing this bondholder litigation as resulting in "endless litigation, resulting
in expense both to the taxpayer and to the bondholder, with the result that nothing has been
accomplished for any of them"); see also Spiotto, supra note 46.
* Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934).
5 Id. at § 80(a) (authorizing a municipality to file a petition for relief provided it had a
plan of readjustment that had been preapproved by holders of thirty percent of indebtedness for
"drainage, irrigation, reclamation, and levee districts and 51 per centum in the case of all other
taxing districts"); § 80(d) (permitting the court to confirm the plan of readjustment if approved
by "66 2/3 per centum in the case of drainage, irrigation, reclamation, and levee districts and
creditors holding 75 per centum in the case of all other taxing districts"); § 80(e) (authorizing
court to confirm a plan that satisfies the statutory requirements).
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tive history leading up to this first municipal bankruptcy law reflects three
concerns about the legitimacy of the new law: the first dealing with Con-
gress's power to pass the law under the Bankruptcy Clause, and the second
and third arising from concerns about state sovereignty." The first concern
was largely put aside, as it was generally agreed that the municipal bank-
ruptcy law would result in a debt composition, which the Court had long
recognized as within the bankruptcy power.6 The two sovereignty concerns
were more contested.
The first sovereignty concern was whether the mere act of filing bank-
ruptcy would interfere with a state's control of its municipality."7 The general
consensus in the legislative history was that a state must consent o a munici-
pal bankruptcy filing." The main disagreement on this front was whether
consent must be explicit or whether it could be implicit, based, for example,
on a state's decision to allow the municipality to issue bonds.9 The issue of
state consent has persisted throughout the development of municipal bank-
ruptcy laws.6 0
The second sovereignty concern related to the bankruptcy law's poten-
tial interference with a state's governmental power.6 1 Despite state sover-
eignty concerns, the legislative history behind the act reflected an
understanding that the bill would pass constitutional muster since the law
focused singularly on financial restructuring.62 Drawing largely from the
era's intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, which dealt with the limits of
the federal government's ability to tax municipalities,63 the legislative history
recognized the dual character of municipalities as both private and public
" See Bills to Amend, supra note 52.
56 Id. at 52. There were some reservations about the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause, but
they do not appear to have been widely shared. According to testimony of Mr. Woods, the
consensus opinion of municipal and bankruptcy laws was that the law was squarely within the
bankruptcy power. See id.
7 Id.
" 8Adjustment of Indebtedness of Municipal Corporations: Hearing on H.R. 1670, H.R.
3083, H.R., 4311, and H.R. 5267 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73rd Cong. 1 (1933).
" Compare id. at 178 (memorandum from the Department of Justice) ("Congress cannot
regulate directly or indirectly, the fiscal policies of the States or their governmental agencies.
The States are entitled to determine for themselves whether or not their municipalities shall be
permitted to go into Federal bankruptcy court and adjust their debts. For Congress to assume to
grant this authority when it has not been given by the State itself, either by general law or by
special enactment, would seem to constitute a prohibited encroachment into a domain where,
under our Constitution, the State is supreme.") with Bills to Amend, supra note 52 (statement
of David M. Woods) ("I grant that the Congress cannot give them the power, but the States
have already granted that power, either expressly or by implication.").
60 See Daniel J. Freyberg, Municipal Bankruptcy and Express State Authorization to Be A
Chapter 9 Debtor: Current State Approaches to Municipal Insolvency-and What Will States
Do Now?, 23 OHio N.U. L. REV. 1001 (1997).
" See Mem. from Homer S. Cummings, Att'y Gen. of the United States, to Hatton W.
Sumners, Chair, H. Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 21, 1933), in To Amend the Bankruptcy Act Munici-
pal and Private Corporations: Hearing on H.R. 1670, H.R. 3083, H.R. 4311, H.R. 5009 and
H.R. 5267 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 73d Cong. 176 (1933).62 Id. at 180.
6 Id. at 177-78. As discussed infra note 287, the intergovernmental tax doctrine from the
Great Depression era has since been rejected as unworkable.
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entities." Municipalities are public in nature to the extent that they exercise
governmental powers; they are private corporations in nature when they en-
gage in private business.6 1 So long as municipal bankruptcy law applied only
to municipalities in their private capacity, it was anticipated that the law
would be constitutional.66 The only question was whether this "dual charac-
ter" would apply only to municipal corporations-such as water or sewer
districts-or also to cities and counties, whose governmental character
might be so dominant as to outweigh its private character.67
These sovereignty concerns-state control over the filing of bankruptcy
and state control over governmental functions-would underlie the develop-
ment of the municipal bankruptcy laws as they developed through the courts
and in later amendments. That is, from the very beginning, Congress has
recognized that municipalities and municipal corporations serve both private
and public functions, and it has expressed concern that bankruptcy law be
limited to only private functions. The attempts to strictly separate these func-
tions provide the foundation for the Great Divide Model.
B. Sovereignty Concerns in Ashton and Bekins
The cases of Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District
and United States v. Bekins discussed in this section set forth the basic archi-
tecture of the municipal bankruptcy laws that highlights two key attributes
for balancing federal and state power: (1) the state has to consent to the use
of municipal bankruptcy law, and (2) federal interference should be
minimal.
In Ashton, the Supreme Court found that the first municipal bankruptcy
law unconstitutionally infringed on states' rights to control their own fiscal
affairs.66 The states have the right to control their own municipalities, which
includes the power to manage their own affairs through contractual relation-
ships with other parties. Bankruptcy, with its "especial purpose . . . to inter-
fere with the relations between the parties concerned," would necessarily
interfere with that internal control, according to the majority.6 9 Although the
Court recognized that such a holding would render states helpless to address
the problem of municipal insolvency, it held that to allow states to obtain
' See David M. Woods, Constitutionality of the Sumners Municipal Relief Bill, H.R.
5950, 10 AM. BANKR. REV. MONTHLY MAG. LAW. BANKERS & Bus. MEN 175, 179 (1933)
(quoting Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570, 576 (1931) for the language
"the [interstate tax] immunity does not extend to anything lying outside or beyond govern-
mental functions and their exertion").
65 See Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345, 356 (1911) (citing South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 461 (1905); Lloyd v. New York, 5 N.Y. 369, 374 (1851); W. Say. Fund.
Soc. v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. 175, 183 (1851)).
66 See id.
67 See Bills to Amend, supra note 52, at 47-49 (statement of David M. Wood); see also
Woods, supra note 64.
" See Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936).69 Id. at 530-31.
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such federal relief would unconstitutionally expand the powers of Congress
to interfere with the "obligations of states or their political subdivisions."7 0
Congress quickly passed an amended municipal bankruptcy law in
1937 with only minor changes." The law went before the Supreme Court
again and was upheld in United States v. Bekins.7 2 The Court made no effort
to highlight the qualities of the revised act that saved this version from the
fate of the 1934 Act, and commentators have acknowledged that he two
laws were substantially similar.3 The main difference, perhaps, is that Be-
kins arose after the notorious "switch in time" that saved the Court from
Roosevelt's proposed Court-packing plan.7 4 The Bekins Court again recog-
nized the potential constitutional problem that might arise if the federal
bankruptcy law could intrude into local municipal governance. However, the
Court highlighted three aspects of the municipal bankruptcy laws that
avoided this problem: (1) the bankruptcy power can be exercised only with
state consent, (2) "[n]o interference with the fiscal or governmental affairs
of a political subdivision is permitted," and (3) "no control or jurisdiction
over that property and those revenues of the petitioning agency necessary for
essential governmental purposes is conferred by the bill."7 Under that
scheme, the Court held that
[W]e have co-operation to provide a remedy for a serious condi-
tion in which the States alone were unable to afford relief.. . .The
bankruptcy power is competent to give relief to debtors in such a
plight and, if there is any obstacle to its exercise in the case of the
districts organized under state law it lies in the right of the State to
oppose federal interference. The State steps in to remove that ob-
stacle. The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign
powers.76
70 Id.
n McConnell & Picker, supra note 23, at 452 (noting that "[w]hile not expressly overrul-
ing Ashton, the Court upheld the new Act without identifying any specific points of distinction
from the earlier Act"). The two acts were not identical, as Robert H. Jackson, then serving as
Solicitor General, outlined in the United States's brief in Bekins. See Br. for the United States
at 79-82, United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938) (No. 757) (listing the following differ-
ences: (1) the old Act permitted the court to order the debtor to file schedules and provide
information to creditors; and (2) the old Act called for a "debt readjustment," which might be
interpreted as more sweeping than the revised act's "debt composition").
72 See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 27 (1938).
" KENNETH KLEE, BANKRUPTCY AND THE SUPREME COURT 152 (LexisNexis 2008) ("A
comparison of Chapters IX and X, however, leads one to wonder what statutory differences
were constitutionally significant. Perhaps there were none.").
74 Commentators have largely agreed that the outcome in Bekins is better understood to
reflect the "switch-in-time"-that is, the Supreme Court's jurisprudential shift following Pres-
ident Roosevelt's proposal to increase the size of the Supreme Court-rather than substantive
differences in the two acts. See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1176 n.108 (gathering
sources supporting this hypothesis).
" Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51.
76 Id. at 53-54.
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Thus, Bekins recognized states' sovereign control over their own munic-
ipalities and found that granting states a municipal bankruptcy option sup-
ported the exercise of that control. Federal law gave the states a tool to
adjust current indebtedness that was otherwise unavailable under the Con-
tracts Clause.
Congress's enduring concern with state-sovereignty is evident in several
amendments to municipal bankruptcy law, discussed in Section C. Section D
will introduce a third main attribute of municipal bankruptcy laws: uniform-
ity in federal bankruptcy. The three attributes of requisite state consent, min-
imal federal interference, and federal uniformity combine to result a scheme
that is at once similar to and importantly distinct from corporate
reorganization.
C. Sovereignty Concerns in Later Amendments
Subsequent amendments to municipal bankruptcy laws have reflected
constant attention to the sovereignty concerns identified in both Ashton and
Bekins. This section explores these amendments as applied to four separate
provisions of the municipal bankruptcy laws: (1) the requirement that a mu-
nicipality may be eligible for bankruptcy relief only with the consent of its
state, (2) the formal restrictions on federal intrusion into governance matters,
(3) the distributional priority requirements, and (4) the requirements to con-
firm a plan of debt adjustment.
1. State Authorization
Since Bekins, it had been understood that a state must consent to any
federal interference with municipal control-even when that interference
was narrowly focused on debt adjustment.77 The question had been whether
this authorization must be explicit or whether it could be inferred."
In the 1976 amendments to the municipal bankruptcy laws, Congress
attempted to address this ambiguity by requiring that the state "generally
authorize" a municipality to file bankruptcy.79 This test produced inconsis-
tent results. Some courts found that if a state had authorized a municipality
to make financial decisions on its own, then it had implicitly authorized the
city to file bankruptcy.0 Accordingly, a state was deemed to have invited
bankruptcy law's intrusion into its municipal governance unless it had spe-
cifically opted out."
n But see Aaron Michael Dmiszewicki, Ashton, Bekins, and Necessity: Why Chapter 9 is
Constitutional, But Not the Only Way for Municipalities to Adjust Their Debts, 23 UNIV. OF
MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 59 (2016).
" See Freyberg, supra note 60, at 1007.
7 Act of April 8, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (1976) (codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 401-18 (1976)).
so See Freyberg, supra note 60, at 1007; see also Juliet M. Moringiello, SpecificAuthoriza-
tion to File under Chapter 9: Lessons from Harrisburg, 32 CAL. BANKR. J. 237, 246 (2012).
" See Freyberg, supra note 60, at 1007.
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As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,82 the law was amended
to require that a state "specifically authorize" a municipal bankruptcy fil-
ing-a result that was more protective of state interests. This change effec-
tively shifted the municipal bankruptcy system from an "opt-out" to an
"opt-in" system-a result perhaps necessary given that only Georgia ever
passed an "opt-out" law. 3
Under the opt-in system, twenty-seven states currently have legislation
authorizing distressed municipalities to seek bankruptcy relief.8 4 Hence, for
twenty-three states, there is no current option to address municipal insol-
vency through bankruptcy." Even in the states that have opted in, they have
done so in inconsistent ways since many states have opted in conditionally.86
For example, state authorization laws may require that the governor or other
state official pre-approve the municipality's plan of adjustment." Michigan
requires several levels of review by state financial accounting boards and the
governor before a city may file bankruptcy.8 California requires that the
entity first declare a fiscal emergency,89 and Louisiana requires that he State
Bond and Tax Board pre-approve a municipality's bankruptcy plan.90 Thus,
even in a state that has a bankruptcy-authorizing statute, the state must take
some additional step before authorizing a municipality to seek bankruptcy
relief.
The result is that Chapter 9 gives significant control to states as to
whether, and under what conditions, a municipality may seek bankruptcy
relief, reflecting the long-held belief that the act of filing bankruptcy is a
significant political decision. The corollary to this state-controlled opt-in
system is that the municipal bankruptcy laws currently may provide relief
only to roughly half of the states. For those states that have not opted in,
their options arguably remain the same as they were in the Great Depression
before Congress passed the municipal bankruptcy laws-"arguably" be-
cause, as discussed infra, the bankruptcy laws may preempt some state laws
even as to the states that have not opted in to the municipal bankruptcy laws.
2. Governmental Powers
Two key provisions of municipal bankruptcy law are the preservation of
state control and the limitation of federal intrusion into local governance.
These provisions were highlighted in Bekins, have remained in force through
82 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 (1994) (codified
as amended in 11 U.S.C. § 903(c)(2) (2012)).
* See Freyberg, supra note 60, at 1015 (identifying Georgia as the only opt-out state).
84 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7.
See id. at 12 (noting that Georgia and Iowa specifically prohibit the use of Chapter 9,
while the other twenty-one states simply have no authorization statute).
16 See id.
See id.
8s MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 141.1547 (West 2016) (alternatively requiring the munici-
pality to participate in a neutral evaluation process).
" CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53760.5 (West 2016).
'o LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4741 (West 2016).
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the modem Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, and provide the statutory
framework for the debt-governance divide.9'
The first such provision, found now in Section 903 of the Bankruptcy
Code, provides a savings clause: "This chapter does not limit or impair the
power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or
in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such
municipality, including expenditures for such exercise . . . ."92 The second,
in Section 904, prohibits the bankruptcy court from interfering with local
governance without he consent of the debtor:
Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consent
or the plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or
decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with-
(1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor;
(2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or
(3) the debtor's use or enjoyment of any income-producing
property.93
These provisions were seen as important safeguarding features of the munic-
ipal bankruptcy laws to ensure that the restructuring would focus on a mu-
nicipality's private, or business, functions, and not on its public, or
governmental, functions.94
Recent scholarship has called into question whether these statutory
safeguards can effectively prevent federal interference.95 Some have even
questioned whether these safeguards are constitutionally mandated.96 These
concerns are discussed further in Part IV.B, but for purposes of this descrip-
tive section, it is enough to note that these provisions reflect, at the very
least, an intensity of congressional concern with state sovereignty in the mu-
nicipal bankruptcy context that is not evident elsewhere in the bankruptcy
laws.97
' See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51, 53-54 (1938).
92 11 U.S.C. § 903 (2012). The addendum to this provision, added in 1946, provides an
important exception, described in greater detail below, as applied to a "state law prescribing a
method of composition of indebtedness." See Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 481, ch. 532, 60
Stat. 409, 415.
9 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). This language was included in Section 80(c)(l1l) of the 1934
Act and in Section 83(c) of the 1937 Act.
9 See Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51, 53-54.
9 See Jacoby, supra note 24, at 104-05 ("The Detroit Blueprint treats Section 904 and its
consent exception as a tool of judicial oversight. While literally consistent with the text, such
an interpretation illustrates how the constraints of Section 904 on federal courts are not nearly
as robust as often claimed.").
" See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1208-16.
9 See id. at 1166.
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3. Creditor Distribution Priorities
Unlike other areas of bankruptcy law, the municipal bankruptcy laws
do not contain a comprehensive creditor distribution priority scheme.98 The
original municipal bankruptcy laws contained no distribution priorities at
all.99 Under that regime, courts could fashion an equitable priority for admin-
istrative expenses, but there were no explicit priority requirements. oo
Such an approach was consistent with corporate bankruptcy practice, in
which the Supreme Court had approved the recognition of such equitable
priorities.0o' In Fosdick v. Schall, a case involving an insolvent railroad, the
Court upheld an equitable administrative priority for "labor, supplies, equip-
ment, or permanent improvement of the mortgaged property as may, under
the circumstances of the particular case, appear to be reasonable."0 2
Later amendments to the municipal bankruptcy laws would reaffirm the
understanding that Fosdick supported the use of equitable priorities in mu-
nicipal bankruptcy cases. In 1976, Congress codified this administrative ex-
pense priority and added two more: debts for services or materials incurred
within three months before the bankruptcy and debts to persons entitled to
priority under other federal laws.103 Two years later, when Congress over-
hauled the whole bankruptcy code, only the administrative expense priority
was retained under Chapter 9.'0 The legislative history explains that he de-
sire was not to rid municipal bankruptcy law of the second priority (which
9 See Juliet M. Moringiello, Chapter 9 Confirnation Standards and the Role of State
Choices, 37 CAMP. L. REv. 71, 100 (2015) [hereinafter Moringiello, Confirmation Standards]
("Very little has been written on the absence of priorities from Chapter 9, and there is no
legislative history explaining their omission.").
" See Lawrence P. King, Municipal Insolvency: Chapter IX, Old and New; Chapter IX
Rules, 50 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55, 58 (1976) ("Chapter IX does not incorporate any of the provi-
sions of Chapters I to VII."). The Chandler Act priorities were found in Chapter VII, Section
64.
'" See H.R. Rep. 94-686, at 28 (1975) ("Section 89 is new. There is no provision in
current law for priorities. However, there are indications, such as in current Section 83(b),
paragraph 4, and in Section 83(e), paragraphs 1, 2, and 3(4), that petitioners under Chapter IX
regularly pay administrative expenses, or those that are incident to the confirmation and con-
summation of a plan.").
.o. See Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 251-53 (1878).
102 Id.
"n Act of April 8, 1976, Pub L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 321 (1976) (codified as amended at
11 U.S.C. § 409 (1976)):
The following shall be paid in full in advance of any distribution to creditors under
the plan, in the following order:
(1) The costs and expenses of administration which are incurred subsequent o the
filing of the petition under this chapter.
(2) Debts owed for services or materials actually provided within three months
before the date of the filing of the petition under this chapter.
(3) Debts owing to any person, which by the laws of the United States (other than
this Act) are entitled to priority.
10 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
at 11 U.S.C. §901(a) (2012)).
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would include wages earned) but to give greater flexibility to courts in deter-
mining this priority under the equitable rule of Fosdick.0
Fosdick has since been challenged in corporate bankruptcies under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, but those challenges do not undercut its
continuing applicability to municipal bankruptcy cases.106 The Seventh Cir-
cuit has held that, in the corporate context, the robust priority scheme of
Chapter 11 has obviated the need (and authority) for equitable priorities.0
The logic of that case does not apply to municipal bankruptcy laws, as Chap-
ter 9 lacks such a comprehensive priority structure. Rather, Chapter 9's mini-
mal priority scheme seems to invite equitable priorities rather than displace
them.
The plan confirmation process contemplates some sort of prioritization
of claims against the municipal debtor. The municipal debtor, after all, is not
required to place its creditors in the same class or to treat creditors exactly
equally. Rather, the plan process permits debtors to place creditors into dif-
ferent classes, even when those creditors have legally similar claims.0
While the Code requires debtors to give equal treatment to all creditors
within a class, it does not require equal treatment as between two separate
classes.109 In fact, it permits the debtor to discriminate horizontally among
classes so long as the discrimination is not "unfair."" 0
Principles of equity might justify different treatment among classes, as
discussed above; however, it is also possible that priorities should be based
on state law. Such an approach would recognize the important state policies
underlying these priorities. For example, statutory priorities may protect vul-
nerable claimants by granting a priority for employee wage claims;"' they
may protect state interests by prioritizing bondholder claims in order to facil-
itate municipalities' access to the capital markets;"2 and they may protect the
"05 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 395 (1977) ("The second [priority], for claims arising
within 3 months before the case is commenced, is deleted from the statute, but may be within
the court's equitable power to award, under the case of Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235 (1878).
Leaving the provision to the courts permits greater flexibility, as under railroad cases, than an
absolute three-month rule.").
106 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004).107 See id. ("Although courts in the days before bankruptcy law was codified wielded
power to reorder priorities and pay particular creditors in the name of 'necessity' . . . today it is
the Code rather than the norms of nineteenth century railroad reorganizations that must prevail
.... Congress did not in terms scuttle old common-law doctrines, because it did not need to;
the Act curtailed, and then the Code replaced, the entire apparatus . . . . Older doctrines may
survive as glosses on ambiguous language enacted in 1978 or later, but not as freestanding
entitlements to trump the text.") (citations omitted).
' See 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (2012).
'" See 11 U.S.C. I 1123(a)(4) (2012).
no See 11 U.S.C. § 129(b)(1) (2012); Andrew B. Dawson, Pensioners, Bondholders, and
Unfair Discrimination in Municipal Bankruptcy, 17 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 1 (2014) [hereinafter
Dawson, Pensioners].
.. See, e.g., In re Bentz Metal Prods. Co., Inc., 253 F.3d 283, 284 (7th Cir. 2001) (analyz-
ing Indiana statutory protection of employees' wage claims).
12 In re Sanitary & Imp. Dist. 65 of Sarpy Cty., Neb., 873 F.2d 209, 210 (8th Cir. 1989)
(analyzing application of a Nebraska statute, Neb. Rev. St. Ann. § 31-755 (West 2016), that
created a priority for bondholders of state sanitary and improvement districts).
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state's revenue by prioritizing tax liabilities. Furthermore, because a plan of
adjustment will determine the allocation of future revenues among creditors,
deferring to state law would arguably be consistent with Section 904's prohi-
bition against the court entering orders regarding the city's "property or
revenues.""3
State law priorities, though, are generally not recognized in bankruptcy
law, except to the extent those priorities are rooted in property rights.14 For
better or for worse, the bankruptcy laws have nearly always displaced non-
property-based state priority laws." Only once did Congress incorporate
state law priorities into the Bankruptcy Code-and that was a short-lived
experiment.116 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included non-bankruptcy priori-
ties, but these were eliminated in the Chandler Act, right around the same
time Congress was revising the original municipal bankruptcy act.' As re-
flected in the legislative history to that change, state priority laws had prolif-
erated with the result that bankruptcy estates were being entirely consumed
by state law priority claims, leaving nothing for the general unsecured credi-
tors."8 The timing of this short-lived experiment and its repeal would make
it surprising to think that Congress did not consider these issues in passing
the municipal bankruptcy laws.
4. Plan Confirmation Requirements
Although the municipal bankruptcy laws lack a robust priority scheme,
the plan confirmation requirements provide some important limitations on
how a municipality's plan may propose to distribute future revenues to credi-
tors. Those plan confirmation requirements, although similar in some ways
to those of Chapter 11, reflect the sovereignty concerns expressed in Bekins.
First, as a procedural matter, in municipal bankruptcy only the debtor may
propose a plan, whereas in corporate cases creditors are permitted to propose
competing plans."9 Second, although the substantive plan confirmation re-
quirements for municipal bankruptcy are very similar to those for confirma-
13 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2012).
"4 See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Wait, Pensions and Property Rights in Municipal
Bankruptcy, 33 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 609 (2014); Thomas J. Kelly, A Method of Protecting
Pensions in Chapter 9: Defining the Interest As A Property Right, 89 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133,
157 (2015).
115 See Hynes & Walt, supra note 114.
"6 See National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544, 563 §64(b)(5)
(1898); see also David Skeel, What is a Lien? Lessons from Municipal Bankruptcy, 2015 U.
ILL. L. REV. 675, 682 ("As originally enacted, the 1898 Act incorporated any nonbankruptcy
priorities that were honored under state or federal law. Concerned that there was little or noth-
ing left for general unsecured creditors in most cases after state law priorities were satisfied,
lawmakers largely eliminated state law priorities under the Chandler Act of 1938, which made
major changes to the 1898 Act.").
"' See Skeel, supra note 116, at 682.
".. See id.
'111 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012).
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tion of a corporate reorganization plan,12 0 the way courts have interpreted
and applied these requirements in municipal bankruptcy highlights the sov-
ereignty concerns that distinguish municipal bankruptcy federalism. This
section will focus on three key requirements that illustrate the differences
between municipal and corporate reorganization: the best interests test,"' the
feasibility test,12 2 and the unfair discrimination test.123 These three require-
ments highlight the roles of state and bankruptcy law in determining how a
municipal debtor may allocate its future revenues.
A court may confirm a Chapter 9 plan of adjustment if, inter alia, "the
plan is in the best interests of creditors." 24 This "best interests test" is not
defined in Chapter 9; however, it is a term of art in Chapter 11 corporate
reorganizations.125 In the Chapter 11 context, courts have interpreted this as
requiring that the plan provide each creditor at least as much under the reor-
ganization plan as it would have received if the estate were liquidated.26 In
the municipal context, there is no liquidation alternative. Accordingly, courts
have considered this test to require that the Chapter 9 plan of adjustment
provide creditors with at least as much as they would have received under
state law.127 State law thus provides the baseline for determining the suffi-
ciency of the bankruptcy plan. This opens the door for state law priorities to
shape the bankruptcy plan.2 8
21 See Moringiello, Confirmation Standards, supra note 98, at 78; 11 U.S.C. § 901 (2012)
(directly incorporating four of the fifteen requirements that Section 1129(a) imposes on con-
sensual plan (i.e., plans approved by all classes of creditors)); II U.S.C. § 943 (2012) (using
the terms "best interests" and "feasible," which are both Chapter 11 terms of art).
121 See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
122 See id.
2 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (incorporating 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(b)(1) (2012)).
124 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
125 11 U.S.C. § I129(a)(7) (2016), provides in full:
(7) With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests-
(A) each holder of a claim or interest of such class-
(i) has accepted the plan; or
(ii) will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the
amount that such holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated
under Chapter 7 of this title on such date.
126 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, T[ 1129.02 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
16th ed. 2016).
127 See In re Corcoran Hosp. Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 454 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1999) (finding
plan to satisfy the best interests test when the plan offered more than could be accomplished
otherwise); In re Sanitary & Imp. Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970, 974 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989) (best
interests requires a finding that "the plan as proposed is better than the alternatives"); In re
Pierce Cty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 718 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) ("The 'best interest of
creditors' requirement of § 943(b)(7) is 'generally regarded as requiring that a proposed plan
provide a better alternative for creditors than what they already have.'") (quoting In re Mount
Carbon, 242 B.R. 18, 34 (Bankr. D. Co. 1999)).
12 See C. Scott Pryor, Municipal Bankruptcy: When Doing Less Is Doing Best, 88 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 85, 121 (2014) ("The best interests test resuscitates the question of state-law
fairness.").
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In a similar manner, Chapter 9 incorporates Chapter 1I's feasibility re-
quirement without definition or guidance.129 As with the "best interests test,"
Chapter 11 does not actually use the word feasibility. Rather, this is the
common name for the statutory requirement that "[c]onfirmation of the plan
is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further finan-
cial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the debtor under the
plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the plan."30
Chapter 9 simply requires the court to find the plan to be "feasible."'31 In
both Chapters 9 and 11, the feasibility test requires the court to assess the
viability of the proposed plan; however, as Moringiello has explained, the
unique nature of municipalities as both private issuers of debt and public
service providers requires courts to apply a special assessment in municipal
bankruptcy cases.'32 In Chapter 9, the feasibility assessment has been inter-
preted as evaluating whether the debtor can make its proposed debt pay-
ments while still providing the essential public services.'33
Finally, Chapter 9 incorporates most of Chapter 1I's "cram down" pro-
visions for confirming a plan over the dissent of an opposing class of credi-
tors. These provisions-incorporated directly into Chapter 9-provide a
protection for the dissenting class of creditors: if the majority of any class of
creditors opposes the plan, the court can nonetheless confirm the plan if the
plan does not "unfairly discriminate" against the dissenting class.13 4 This test
has been described as requiring horizontal parity.' 5 Among creditors at the
same level of priority, the plan must treat them roughly the same. Treatment
may differ but not in a way that is unfairly discriminatory. While some have
argued that this test should be interpreted identically in both corporate and
municipal contexts,13 6 others have argued that the test requires assessing the
differing treatments within the context of municipalities' political func-
tions.13 7 Differing treatment may be tolerated to the extent it reflects govern-
ance policies.
These confirmation standards highlight the unique federalism relation-
ship in municipal bankruptcy. Unlike preemption analyses that may result in
federal law displacing, in full or in part, state laws, the confirmation stan-
dards reflect a dual role for federal and state law. Even though federal law
provides the rules for plan confirmation, these confirmation rules leave sig-
nificant room for state law. Thus, state law may play an important role in
129 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2012).
13o 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012).
131 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7).
132 See Moringiello, Confirmation Standards, supra note 98, at 80.
133 See id.
'3 11 U.S.C. § 129(b)(1) (incorporated into 11 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2012)).
'31 See Bruce A. Markell, A New Perspective on Unfair Discrimination in Chapter 11, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 227-28 (1998) ("[U]nfair discrimination is best viewed as a horizontal
limit on nonconsensual confirmation, in contrast to the vertical limit imposed by the require-
ment that a nonconsensual plan be 'fair and equitable."').
" See, e.g., Hynes & Walt, supra note 114, at 637-38.
7 See, e.g., Moringiello, Confirmation Standards, supra note 98, at 84; Dawson, Pen-
sioners, supra note 110.
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applying the federal bankruptcy laws. At the same time, these confirmation
standards not only invite state participation into the debt side of the equation,
but they also create an opportunity for the bankruptcy court o have a role in
the operational side."' McConnell and Picker described this as creating the
potential for "judicial control by a wink and a nod," as a court could refuse
to confirm a plan unless, for example, the city promised to raise taxes.13 9
Although certainly not exhaustive, a review of these confirmation re-
quirements shows how these standards reflect a municipal bankruptcy feder-
alism that, while similar in some ways to bankruptcy federalism questions, is
importantly distinct in others. Even though the language of the confirmation
requirements in Chapters 9 and 11 are similar, the requirements reflect
deeper sovereignty concerns in the municipal bankruptcy context.
D. Uniformity
Thus far, the background on municipal insolvency law has highlighted a
persistent concern with state sovereignty; however, there hasbeen an equally
persistent countervailing concern with federal supremacy. While the sover-
eignty concerns provide the background for the governance side of the Great
Divide Model, the uniformity concern motivates the debt side.
The uniformity-side of this equation arises from the language of the
Bankruptcy Clause, which gives Congress the power to enact "uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies." The significance of "uniform law" has
posed problems since the Marshall Court: to what extent does uniformity
displace state debtor-creditor laws.140 In the municipal bankruptcy context,
the question is whether the enactment of "uniform" municipal bankruptcy
laws preempts state laws that would attempt to restructure municipalities'
finances.
Although Congress's constitutional authority to enact "uniform laws on
the subject of bankruptcies" might suggest that the federal government has a
monopoly on bankruptcy laws, the Court has found that states may pass
bankruptcy laws, so long as those laws do not unconstitutionally impair the
obligation of contracts or conflict with federal bankruptcy laws. The states
38 See Vincent S. J. Buccola, Law and Legislation in Municipal Bankruptcy, CARDOZO L.
REV. (forthcoming), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2534856 [https://perma.cc/RH5E-JPJC];
McConnell & Picker, supra note 23 (arguing that courts could use the best interests test to
indirectly force operational changes).
'9 McConnell & Picker, supra note 23.
40 See Stephen J. Lubben, Puerto Rico and the Bankruptcy Clause, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J.
553, 563 (2014) (describing how a series of cases beginning in the Marshall Court considered,
but consistently rejected, "the proposition that the Clause takes bankruptcy and insolvency
away from the States"); Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws:
A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 22, 22 (1983)
("The interpretation of the constitutional provision empowering Congress to make 'uniform
Laws ... on the subject of Bankruptcies' has defied principled interpretation since its adoption
and continues to be a source of analytical confusion, particularly in the area of bankruptcy
exemptions.").
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retain the power to pass bankruptcy laws.141 Thus, during most of the nine-
teenth century when there was no federal bankruptcy law in place, bank-
ruptcy legislation was entirely in the realm of state law.142
During those periods in which there was no federal bankruptcy law, the
primary limitation on state bankruptcy laws was the Contracts Clause, which
invalidated states laws purporting to discharge prior debts; however, state
bankruptcy laws could discharge debts incurred after the law's enactment.143
When Congress passed what would become the first permanent bank-
ruptcy law in 1898, however, that law was held to preempt state laws within
its field. Thus, states could no longer discharge debts at all, whether prospec-
tively or retrospectively.144 Aside from that limitation, though, there was un-
certainty about when a state debtor-creditor law fell within the scope of the
federal bankruptcy laws.
When Congress passed the first municipal bankruptcy laws, this like-
wise raised the question of preemption: to what extent did the municipal
bankruptcy laws preempt state local rescue laws? The Court addressed the
question in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park.145
In Faitoute, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New Jersey
state law designed to address municipal financial distress.146 New Jersey had
attempted to restructure the debts of Asbury Park under state law-a process
New Jersey had begun while awaiting the revised municipal bankruptcy
law. 147 Under the New Jersey statute, the city proposed a plan to refund its
outstanding bonds for new bonds, extending the maturity date and lowering
the interest rate.148 The city obtained the approval of eighty-five percent of
its bondholders; however, a group of dissenters opposed the plan and ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the New Jersey statute unconstitu-
tionally impaired the obligation of contracts and that the new municipal
bankruptcy law preempted this state rescue law-i.e., that Congress had
seized control over municipal insolvency, thus suspending New Jersey's
law. 149
The Court rejected this monopolization argument.5 0 In an opinion by
Justice Frankfurter, the Court found that the municipal bankruptcy laws-
even if they applied to the bonds issued before those laws were enacted-
141 See Lubben, supra note 140.
142 See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate
Bankruptcy, 72 TEx. L. REV. 471 (1994).
143 See Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 135-36 (1819) (retroactive application of a
state bankruptcy law to previously incurred debts was an unconstitutional impairment of the
obligation of contracts); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 368-69 (1827) (prospective applica-
tion of a state bankruptcy law did not impair the obligation of contracts).
'" See Pobreselo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1933) (upholding a
Wisconsin assignment law that, even though similar to bankruptcy law in some ways, was
"quite in harmony with the purposes of the federal [bankruptcy] act").
14 See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 507 (1942).
1
46 Id.
'14 Id. at 504.
148 Id. at 507.
149 Id.
50 Id. at 508.
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did not suspend the New Jersey statute.'5' Frankfurter reasoned that the mu-
nicipal bankruptcy law had been "carefully drawn so as not to impinge on
the sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal affairs. The
bankruptcy power is exercised . . . only in a case where the action of the
taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved by the bank-
ruptcy court is authorized by state law." 52 Here, New Jersey had not author-
ized Asbury Park to file bankruptcy. Consequently, he concluded that the
federal municipal bankruptcy laws could have not preemptive effect on the
New Jersey statute.153
Because Congress had carefully limited the revised bankruptcy laws in
order to protect state sovereignty, New Jersey retained the power to adjust
debts, provided it did so without unconstitutionally impairing the obligation
of contracts.154 Thus, following Faitoute, the patchwork of state financial
rescue laws continued, at least as applied to those states that had, like New
Jersey, not opted in to the municipal bankruptcy option. The municipal bank-
ruptcy laws did not shift control over municipal bankruptcy to the federal
government; rather, control remained with the states. Uniformity thus gave
way to state sovereignty.
Congress immediately sought to overrule Faitoute in order to create a
uniform system of municipal bankruptcy.' Section 83(i) of the Act, which
had previously served the significant role of ensuring that federal bankruptcy
law would not impede a state's ability to control its municipalities, was
amended by adding the following italicized language:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit or
impair the power of any State to control, by legislation or other-
wise, any political subdivision thereof in the exercise of its politi-
cal or governmental powers, including expenditures therefor;
Provided, however, That no state law prescribing a method of
composition of indebtedness of such agencies shall be binding
upon any creditor who does not consent to such composition, and
no judgment shall be entered under such State law which would
bind a creditor to such composition without his consent.'5 "
The House Report explained that this amendment was intended to pre-
empt state bankruptcy laws seeking to bind nonconsenting creditors, reflect-
ing a monopolization policy: "[A] bankruptcy law under which bondholders
'' Id.
12 Id. (quoting United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 50-51 (1938)).
'5 Id. at 508-09 ("Can it be that a power that was not recognized until 1938, and when so
recognized, was carefully circumscribed to reserve full freedom to the states, has now been
completely absorbed by the federal government-that a state which, as in the case of New
Jersey, has after long study devised elaborate machinery for the autonomous regulation of
problems as peculiarly local as the fiscal management of its own household, is powerless in
this field? We think not.").
1
54 Id. at 512-13.
"' Act of July 1, 1946, Pub. L. No. 481, ch. 532, 60 Stat. 409, 415.
156 Id.
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of a municipality are required to surrender or cancel their obligations should
be uniform throughout the 48 States ....
While this amended language is widely acknowledged as overruling
Faitoute and increasing federal control in this arena, there are reasons to
doubt its effectiveness.'" As an initial matter, it is not at all- clear that it
would have actually applied to the New Jersey statute, as that statute argua-
bly imposed a "debt adjustment" and not a "cotposition."59 Debt composi-
tion laws affect the principal amount of indebtedness; debt adjustment laws
modify repayment terms, such as interest rates and maturity dates.160 The
New Jersey statute, as described in Faitoute, specifically prohibited adjusting
the principal, thus making it likely a debt adjustment law, not a composition
law.161
The uncertain scope of this adjustment/composition distinction arose
again in the financial crisis of New York City in the 1970s.162 Municipal
bankruptcy law at that time was perceived as unworkable for large cities,
and so the state of New York addressed the city's insolvency under state law.
One such response was to pass the New York State Emergency Moratorium
Act, which suspended payment on certain city debts.163 Challengers asserted
that the Act was a debt composition law, thus preempted by Section 83. '1
The court in Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York rejected this, holding that the
New York law imposed an "extension and not a proscribed composition."'65
The New York City crisis prompted Congress to revisit the municipal
bankruptcy laws, making those laws better suited for large cities. As part of
that effort, there were proposals to remove the preemption language in Sec-
tion 83(i) altogether.16 6 This would have undermined the goal of national
uniformity; however, it was suggested that non-uniformity might be out-
weighed by "the interests of the States in the management of their own fiscal
affairs." 67 The draw of uniformity, however, ultimately prevailed. Congress
retained this language, explaining that it "was enacted in response to, and
overruled the holding of the Supreme Court in [Faitoute]," and then quoting
the 1946 House Report language discussing the need for national
uniformity.'68
1 H.R. REP. No. 2246, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 24 (1946); see also U.S. CODE CONGRES-
SIONAL SERVICE, 1246-49 (1946).
`8 See Freyberg, supra note 60, at 1012 ("Congress, however, disagreed with the Su-
preme Court and enacted what is now Section 903. Section 903 prevents state authorization of
compositions of indebtedness which are binding on non-consenting creditors. Congress' stated
purpose in enacting this section was to ensure equal treatment of municipal bondholders
throughout the nation.").
I' See Lubben, supra note 140, at 570.
`60 See id. at 570 n.109 (defining composition laws).
... See id. at 570.
162 See Ropico, Inc. v. City of New York, 425 F. Supp. 970, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
6. See id.
1" See id. at 978.
165 Id. at 983.
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Congress again flirted with deleting this language when it overhauled
the bankruptcy laws in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which relabeled
Chapter IX as Chapter 9 and moved Section 83(i) to Section 903(l).169 The
House Report explains that, in light of the now-overruled decision of Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,o70 legislators discerned that the Supreme
Court might be increasingly sensitive to federal court interference with state
control."' It was thought removing the provision would preserve the consti-
tutionality of Chapter 9 by "recogniz[ing] the power of the States to assist
municipal work-outs short of bankruptcy court." 72
Despite this concern, Congress retained the preemption language, con-
tinuing to express the goal of creating a uniform system for municipal insol-
vency. The Senate Report explained the need to retain the preemption
language: "Deletion of the provision would 'permit all states to enact their
own versions of Chapter IX' . . . which would frustrate the constitutional
mandate of uniform bankruptcy laws." 73
Accordingly, even though Congress has consistently expressed concern
that municipal bankruptcy laws not interfere with state control over munici-
pal governance, it has also sought to ensure that federal law provides the
only way to adjust municipal debts. These competing concerns provide the
foundation for the Great Divide Model. Leaving governance matters to the
states respects state sovereignty; concentrating debt adjustment matters in
federal bankruptcy law respects federal superiority.
The case studies in the following part describe the way these dynamics
have played out in recent high-profile municipal insolvency crises. They also
highlight the flaw in trying to balance these competing concerns by catego-
rizing matters as governance- or debt-related.
II. MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCY FEDERALISM: THE GREAT DIvIDE MODEL
As described in the previous part, municipal bankruptcy law has tried to
balance the interests of state sovereignty and of federal supremacy. This part
uses case studies to describe the dominant model courts have used to analyze
these federalism issues: the Great Divide Model. Matters that are debt-re-
lated belong exclusively in the federal sphere; those that are governance-
related belong in the state sphere. This formalist approach thus treats federal-
ism matters as definitional matters. The key is to define the power at
question.
The federalism concerns have arisen in two principal contexts. First,
courts have had to analyze the preemptive scope of Chapter 9, in other
words, the extent to which Congress has left room for states to address mu-
" Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
17( 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
"' See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 5964 (1977).
172 Id.
"' S. REP. No. 95-989, at 109 (1978).
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nicipal insolvency. That issue is discussed in Section A of this part, which
frames the analysis through two case studies involving Pontiac, Michigan,
and Puerto Rico. Second, courts have had to consider the ability of federal
law to "leak" into governance matters, an issue discussed in Section B,
which frames the analysis through case studies involving Stockton, Califor-
nia, and Detroit.
While these cases illustrate the Great Divide Model, they also highlight
the descriptive and normative flaws in the model. Descriptively, the Great
Divide Model fails because it is not always possible to categorize matters as
exclusively governance- or debt-related. Normatively, it fails because it ob-
scures the tradeoffs between federal supremacy and state control in the mu-
nicipal insolvency framework. It has permitted federal intervention into local
governance matters that are at least partly financial in nature, without con-
sidering the impact on state sovereignty. This model of federalism permits
the expansion of federal power in this context, and it fails to provide an
analytical framework to consider the costs of such expansion.
A. State Law Alternatives
The first context in which courts have analyzed municipal bankruptcy
federalism is in those cases in which states have attempted to resolve munic-
ipal financial distress under state law-that is, without resorting to bank-
ruptcy relief. Following Faitoute and the enactment of Section 83(i), now
Section 903(1), it is clear that once a state opts in to the municipal bank-
ruptcy relief, it can no longer use state law to impose a debt adjustment
plan.174 Some have expressed doubts, though, as to this preemptive scope:
does Section 903(1) likewise preempt state composition laws for states that
have not opted in?' And how broad is that preemptive scope, as debt "com-
position" laws may be much narrower than characterized by the statute's
legislative history? 76
Despite these concerns, the case studies below illustrate that courts
have characterized Congress's power to pass bankruptcy laws as an exclu-
sive one. Employing the Great Divide's formalist approach, these courts
have sidestepped the potentially larger constitutional concerns arising from
this increase in federal power, such as whether courts are impermissibly in-
truding upon state sovereignty.
174 See Lubben, supra note 140, at 570-71 ("[I]t seems clear that for states that have
opted in to Chapter 9, the chapter becomes the sole means of addressing municipal financial
distress.").
171 See id.; see also David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 730
n.230 (2012) (noting this uncertainty).
76 See Lubben, supra note 140, at 570.
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1. Case Study: Pontiac, MI
Pontiac, Michigan, illustrates the potential for the Great Divide Model
to permit federal intervention into municipal governance matters even when
the municipality has not filed bankruptcy. Michigan has received significant
attention for its use of emergency managers-most of it negative, especially
based on the tragic situation in state-controlled Flint. 177 While Flint's case
may call into question the effectiveness of state law interventions, that of
Pontiac called into question whether bankruptcy law limits the reach of such
state laws even as to cities that have not filed bankruptcy.
Michigan's Local Financial Stability and Choice Act permits the gover-
nor to appoint an emergency manager to assume control over financially
distressed cities.178 The emergency manager may attempt to address the fis-
cal crisis under state law or recommend that the governor authorize a bank-
ruptcy filing. With the city of Pontiac, the emergency manager has attempted
to restructure the city's finances without seeking federal bankruptcy relief;
however, as discussed in this section, the Sixth Circuit has suggested that-
even though Pontiac has not filed bankruptcy or received state authorization
to do so-Section 903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code may limit Michigan
law.179
Pontiac was placed under the control of a state-appointed emergency
manager in March 2009.1s0 The emergency manager was authorized to take
over all financial decisions, amend budgets, renegotiate labor contracts, and
reorganize departments in order to address the city's significant budget defi-
cit.'"' Although Michigan law permits the emergency manager to file bank-
ruptcy if authorized by the governor, the emergency manager sought to
address the city's problems outside of bankruptcy.8 2 Thus, no bankruptcy
was ever authorized or filed.
Beginning in 2011, the emergency manager issued a series of orders to
reduce and eliminate public retirees' health care benefits.83 The retirees chal-
lenged this move on two grounds: (1) such a modification would unconstitu-
tionally impair their contractual rights, and (2) the emergency manager's
power was suspended by Chapter 9.184
71 See Julie Bosman & Monica Davey, Anger in Michigan over Appointment Emergency
Managers, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/23/us/anger-in-mich-
igan-over-appointing-emergency-managers.html?_r=O [https://perma.cc/L3AK-EGFV].
" Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Act 436 of 2012, MICH. COMP. LAWS §
147.1558.
"' See Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass'n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 427, 429-31 (6th Cir. 2014)
(per curiam).
"s See Catherine Jun, State Takes Over Pontiac Finances, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 20, 2009,
2009 WLNR 17079909.
' See id.
182 See Local Financial Stability and Choice Act, Act 436 of 2012, MICH. COMP. LAWS §
147.1558 (empowering emergency manager to recommend to the governor that the municipal-
ity be authorized to file a petition for bankruptcy relief).
1' See Schimmel, 751 F.3d at 429.
'
8 4 See id. at 430-31.
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The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled in a per curiam decision that
the health care modifications may violate the Contracts Clause and sug-
gested that they may also be expressly preempted by Chapter 9.115 Section
903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, according to the court, may displace state
laws even if the city has not sought bankruptcy protection, if such state law
would effect "a method of composition of indebtedness that binds the retir-
ees without their consent."'86 It then remanded to consider all the relevant
factors for determining the retirees' Contracts Clause and due process
claims. 1
Judge McKeague concurred in the ruling but wrote separately to ad-
dress the Section 903 argument. He cautioned that Section 903(1) may not
necessarily preempt all state laws as it could be read more narrowly to pre-
empt state composition laws only when Chapter 9 is invoked.'8 In support
of this narrower interpretation, he noted that the preemption language should
be read in its context as an exception to Section 903's savings clause. That
savings clause applies only when Chapter 9 is invoked. Therefore, the pre-
emption language might also apply only when Chapter 9 is invoked.18 9
The court's ruling is consistent with the Great Divide Model: to the
extent the emergency manager attempts to adjust debts over the opposition
of creditors, this belongs in the exclusive power of the bankruptcy laws. At
the same time though, this holding is quite jarring when applied to states that
have not authorized a bankruptcy filing. Consider what Michigan's power
would have looked like without a federal municipal bankruptcy law: just like
states during the Great Depression, Michigan would have had to craft a plan
that would reduce debts without unconstitutionally impairing the obligation
'8 Id. at 431 ("[T]he plain language of this section is not limited to bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The retirees' Bankruptcy Code claim turns on whether Public Act 4 (or Public Act 436, to
the extent relevant on remand) prescribes a method of composition of indebtedness that binds
the retirees without their consent and, if so, whether principles of state sovereignty preclude
application of § 903(1) in this case.").
18 Id. The full text of Section 903 reads:
This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation
or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or
governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise,
but-
(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such mu-
nicipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition; and
(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not
consent to such composition.
II U.S.C. § 903.
'" Schimmel, 751 F.3d at 433.
'" Id. ("[S]ubsection (1) is an exception to the general proposition that Chapter 9 does
not limit or impair State power. The exception appears to reflect congressional intent that
where Chapter 9 is invoked, it does operate to limit or impair State power in relation to the
specific type of State law described in subsection (1). Viewed in context, then, the plain lan-
guage of § 903(1) may be construed to mean, and today's opinion should not be read to fore-
close the possibility, that § 903(1) represents a specific limitation on State power only where
Chapter 9 has been invoked.").
' See id. at 433-34.
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of contracts. Following the Sixth Circuit's ruling, though, states that have
chosen not to use the municipal bankruptcy laws are actually in a worse
situation. Their powers are limited not only by the Contracts Clause but also
by a bankruptcy law that they have elected not to use.
The Sixth Circuit reached this result under a plain reading of Section
903(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, without considering whether such limitation
of state power-without state consent-would be constitutional. While the
court's ruling is arguably consistent with the legislative purpose of Section
903(1), it does not consider whether such non-consensual centralization of
power unconstitutionally intrudes upon state sovereignty.
2. Case Study: Puerto Rico's Recovery Act
This dynamic has also played out-albeit with many sui generis charac-
teristics-in Puerto Rico's attempt to restructure the debts of its public cor-
porations under Puerto Rican law. As described in this section, Puerto Rico,
unlike the fifty states, cannot authorize its municipalities to file bankruptcy.
This constraint left open the question, on which the Supreme Court recently
ruled, as to whether the municipal bankruptcy laws nonetheless limited Pu-
erto Rico's ability to address its financial crisis on its own.
Puerto Rico lost its investment bond rating in 2014, at which point it
was described as a "behemoth" among non-sovereign government borrow-
ers, "with roughly $60 billion of direct and indirect obligations outstanding,
with another $10 billion in limited obligations."90 Since then, this debt has
ballooned to over $71 billion in public debt.'9 ' A considerable portion of this
debt-around thirty billion dollars-is owed by the Commonwealth's public
agencies that supply public services such as the water and electricity authori-
ties.192 The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, or PREPA, with over nine
billion dollars in debt, has received the majority of the attention, as it is the
focus of litigation with U.S. hedge fund investors.'93
Even though Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code recognizes Puerto Rico
as a "state," Chapter 9 makes Puerto Rican municipalities ineligible for
bankruptcy relief.194 For reasons unknown, Congress excluded Puerto Rico in
`ooTom Tzitzouris, Why Would a Puerto Rico Debt Crisis Matter?, FORBES (Oct. 16,
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/10/16/why-would-a-puerto-rico-debt-crisis-
matter/.
`9 See DEP'T OF TREASURY, PUERTO Rico's ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CRISIS, https://
www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Documents/PuertoRicosfiscalchallenges.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/CG9P-3PFZ].
92 FED. REs. BANK OF N.Y., AN UPDATE ON THE COMPETITIVENESS OF PUERTO Rico's
ECONOMY (July 31, 2014), https://www.newyorkfed.org/outreach-and-education/puerto-rico/
2014/report-main.html [https://perma.cc/4YKM-JKLM] (listing the amount as twenty-four
billion dollars); Robert Rasmussen, Puerto Rico: Of Capital Structures, Control Rights and
Liquidity, CAP. MKTS. L. J. 14 (forthcoming 2016) (listing the amount as around thirty billion
dollars).
1 See, e.g., Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015).
194 II U.S.C. § 101(52) (2012) ("The term 'State' includes the District of Columbia and
Puerto Rico, except for the purpose of who may be a debtor under chapter 9 of this title."); see
also Lubben, supra note 140.
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the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.195 This has
left Puerto Rico without the option of using Chapter 9 to address the fiscal
distress of its municipalities and public corporations.
Although the states have the authority to use bankruptcy law to adjust
the debts of public corporations under Chapter 9, Congress has denied such
an option to Puerto Rico. With no bankruptcy relief available, Puerto Rico
attempted to address the insolvency of its municipalities under Puerto Rican
law, drafting a commonwealth law that is intentionally and expressly similar
to Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.196 The Puerto Rico Public Corporation
Debt Enforcement and Recovery Actl 97 (the "Recovery Act") would provide
a means to impose a debt adjustment plan on creditors, just as would be
possible under Chapter 9.
This law, however, was immediately challenged by PREPA bondhold-
ers and found to be preempted by the bankruptcy laws.198 The First Circuit,
in upholding that decision, held that Congress has the power to extend Chap-
ter 9 to Puerto Rico but has declined to do so-that is, Congress "preserved
to itself that power to authorize Puerto Rican municipalities to seek Chapter
9 relief'-thereby preempting Puerto Rico's attempt to approximate Chapter
9 relief under commonwealth law.199
The Supreme Court recently ruled on this preemption matter, holding
that Section 903(1) has statutorily preempted the Recovery Act.200 Even
though Congress exempted Puerto Rico from bankruptcy eligibility, the
Court found that Puerto Rico is still a "state" as defined in the Bankruptcy
Code.201 Thus, Section 903(1)'s language that "a State law prescribing a
method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind
any creditor that does not consent to such composition" would apply to all
"states," including Puerto Rico.202 In other words, the Court interpreted the
preemption language in Section 903(1) as creating an exclusively federal
195 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98
Stat. 333 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 101(52)); see also Lubben, supra note 140, at
572 (noting that the exclusion happened as part of a much larger change to the bankruptcy
laws in response to the Supreme Court's decisions in N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) and NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984), and so
most of the legislative history dealt with that overhaul).
196 Puerto Rico Public Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, Act No. 71 (June
28, 2014), at 173, makes clear its intent to copy Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code:
In designing chapter 3, this Legislative Assembly has adopted a model similar to
that of chapter 9 of title 11 of the United States Code in order to provide all stake-
holders with much needed familiarity in a process wrought with uncertainty. As a
result, this Legislative Assembly clearly expresses its intent that jurisprudence inter-
preting the provisions of chapter 9 of title 11 of the United States Code be used, to
the extent applicable, for purposes of interpreting the provisions of chapter 3 of this
Act.
'97 Id.
'9 See generally Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322 (1st Cir. 2015).
'9 Id. at 325.
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remedy for addressing municipal debt restructuring. As Justice Thomas
wrote, "The Federal Bankruptcy Code pre-empts state bankruptcy laws that
enable municipalities to restructure their debts over the objection of creditors
and instead requires municipalities to restructure such debts under Chapter 9
of the Code."203
The Court found this result to be dictated by the plain meaning of the
statute. However, as the dissent argued, such a result is inconsistent with the
overall structure of Section 903 and Chapter 9.204 After all, Section 903 was
designed as a savings clause, ensuring that states would remain in control
over governance matters in a Chapter 9 case. As such, it would seem to
apply only to those debtors that had actually commenced a Chapter 9 case-
otherwise, there would be no concern about federal intervention in govern-
ance matters.205 Unless and until the state authorizes its municipality to file
bankruptcy, there would be no threat of federal intervention and hence no
need for Section 903's savings clause. Accordingly, it would not make sense
to apply Section 903 at all to Puerto Rican municipalities that are excluded
from Chapter 9 relief.
Although Puerto Rico is sui generis in some ways-namely, because of
its commonwealth status206 and because only it and the District of Columbia
are excluded from Chapter 9 eligibility-Puerto Rico's attempted local res-
cue law highlights the interaction of state and federal level control over dis-
tressed municipalities. The opinion's recitation of an exclusive power to
restructure municipal debts reflects the one of the core tenets of the Great
Divide Model: only federal law can restructure debts. Finally, it shows how
such an assumption of federal uniformity limits state control over local
governance.
B. Debt-Governance Divide?
Whereas the prior section examined how the Great Divide Model has
led to the expansion of federal power when states have sought to address
municipal insolvency outside of bankruptcy, this section examines how this
model has likewise expanded federal power inside of bankruptcy. Since the
municipal bankruptcy law's first enactment, there has been a persistent con-
cern that bankruptcy courts might overreach into areas of state control.207
The municipal bankruptcy laws have always contained provisions aiming to
20
1 Id. at 1942.
204 Id. at 1949 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) ("The structure of the Code and the language
and purpose of § 903 demonstrate that Puerto Rico's municipal debt restructuring law should
not be read to be prohibited by Chapter 9.").
205 See id. at 1945.
206 See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2016) (describing Puerto
Rico's "unique political relationship" with the United States).
207 See supra Part L.A-IC.
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limit courts' reach to only the business, or private, activities of municipali-
ties, leaving governance matters in the hands of the state.208
This debt-governance divide has raised important questions about the
effectiveness and limits of the municipal bankruptcy laws. How far can
bankruptcy law reach into the operational restructuring of a municipal
debtor? And how much room, if any, is there for state law to exercise its
operational control to influence the financial restructuring of municipalities
in bankruptcy? The first question is a longstanding one, identified in Mc-
Connell and Picker's seminal work in this field; however, it is one that has
received renewed interest and importance in recent municipal bankruptcy
cases.209 For example, as Melissa Jacoby has explored in great detail, bank-
ruptcy courts may have much greater than anticipated power to influence
operational matters through a combination of previously underappreciated
procedural tools.2 10 The second question has likewise garnered more interest,
as recent scholarship by Clayton Gillette and David Skeel has argued that
bankruptcy courts should have more power to engage in operational
restructuring.2 11
The cases below provide examples of how these issues have arisen and
how courts recited the formal division between debt and governance while
attempting at the same time to work within that formal divide in order to
balance the federal and state interests in these disputes. Ultimately, as argued
more fully in Part III infra, what these cases help show is that the formal
distinctions between debt and governance and between federal and state con-
trol are simply not analytically useful. They fail both as descriptive and as
prescriptive models of municipal bankruptcy federalism.
1. Stockton, CA
The bankruptcy of Stockton, California, brought to the fore the conflict
between bankruptcy and state laws as related to pension obligations.212 As
described in this subsection, the federal bankruptcy court addressed this is-
sue within a Great Divide Model framework, treating bankruptcy law as
having a monopoly on debt adjustment. The court's analysis reflects a more
nuanced view of federalism; however, that view is largely obscured by the
Great Divide Model formalism.
Stockton proposed a bankruptcy plan that would impair its bond obliga-
tions but leave intact its pension obligations. One bondholder, Franklin Tem-
pleton, objected to the plan confirmation, arguing in part that Stockton's
refusal to impair its pension obligations showed that the plan was not
208 See supra Part I.A-I.C.
21 McConnell & Picker, supra note 23.
210 Jacoby, supra note 24.
211 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6.
212 See In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), aff'd in part, dismissed in
part, 542 B.R. 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
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proposed in good faith.2 13 To evaluate this argument, the bankruptcy court
considered whether Stockton even could have impaired those obligations. At
issue was whether California's pension laws would prohibit such impair-
ment. Ultimately, the court held that even though Stockton could have im-
paired its pension plans, its refusal to do so was not in bad faith.2 14 The
court's analysis of the interaction of California's pension laws with the fed-
eral bankruptcy laws was likely dicta, as the court would have upheld Stock-
ton's plan whether or not bankruptcy law preempted California law.2 15
Nonetheless, the court's analysis of the matter is instructive.
At the heart of the dispute was California's Public Employees' Retire-
ment Law (PERL).2 16 PERL purports to prohibit municipal debtors from re-
jecting any pension servicing contract between a bankrupt municipality and
the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CALPERS). 217
CALPERS contended that this California statute effectively prohibits
Stockton from rejecting the pension servicing agreement, as such an agree-
ment reflects an exercise of the state's "political or governmental" powers
over Stockton.218 As a political or governmental power, CALPERS argued,
bankruptcy law could not interfere with the California statute, as Section 903
preserves the state's control over the "political or governmental powers" of
a municipal debtor.2 19
In considering this issue, the court began its analysis from a highly
formalist position: "Congress has power, exclusive of the states, to legislate
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy."2 20 Thus, the bankruptcy laws
preempt California's attempt at protecting CALPERS plans.221 Otherwise,
2'3 See id.
214 Id. at 62 ("While the loss of about $30 million is unfortunate for Franklin, it reflects
the bargain that Franklin made and the risk that it undertook. Its 17.5% overall return is not so
paltry or unfair as to undermine the legitimacy of classification in the plan or the good faith of
the plan proponent.").
215 See id. at 41, n.6 (after suggesting that CALPERS lacked standing to oppose Franklin
Templeton, the court dropped a footnote explaining that "[it is not necessary to explore
CALPERS' motivations for its extraordinary legal effort in this case in defense of pensions for
which it bears little financial risk. For whatever reason, CALPERS chose to intrude itself into
this case and repeatedly (at virtually every hearing) insist hat it is impossible as a matter of
law to reject or modify its pension administration contract and the related pensions. This opin-
ion answers the question that CALPERS kept thrusting upon the court.").2
'
6 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'r CODE § 20460.
217 CAL. Gov'r CODE § 20487 ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no con-
tracting agency or public agency that becomes the subject of a case under the bankruptcy
provisions of Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 901) of Title 11 of the United States Code
shall reject any contract or agreement between that agency and the [CALPERS] board pursu-
ant to Section 365 of Title 11 of the United States Code or any similar provision of law; nor
shall the agency, without the prior written consent of the board, assume or assign any contract
or agreement between that agency and the board pursuant to Section 365 of Title 11 of the
United States Code or any similar provision of law.").
2' In re City of Stockton, California, 526 B.R. 35, 51-52 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), aff'd in part,
dismissed in part, 542 B.R. 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
219 See id.
220 Id. at 49-50.
221 See id. at 39.
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California law would "usurp the exclusive power of Congress to legislate
uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcy."22
As to CALPERS' argument that Section 903 of the Bankruptcy Code
saves certain state political and governmental legislation from the scope of
preemption, the court held that the California statute did not fit within this
exception.223 While Section 903 preserves state control over "political or
governmental powers," it does not define what those powers include. Find-
ing the legislative history opaque, the court looked to other provisions of
Chapter 9 that require any bankruptcy plan to comply with state regulatory
and electoral laws. The court determined that "political or governmental
powers" should likewise be read as including regulatory approval require-
ments.224 This power excludes "financial and employment" relations. The
court's conclusion bears quoting in full:
The 'political or governmental' functions in § 903 refer to basic
matters of the organization and operation of government that are
incidents of sovereignty, but do not extend to financial relations
between the state and its municipalities . . . . While § 903 protects
the basic incidents of state sovereignty-described as 'political
and governmental' powers-from encroachment, contractual rela-
tions as between state and municipality are generally outside the
ambit of 'political or governmental' powers.225
The court's analysis suggests that the contract between Stockton and
CALPERS might qualify as political or governmental in nature if the facts
were slightly different. California allows cities like Stockton to use private
pension administrators instead of CALPERS. The pension laws provide cer-
tain incentives for cities to choose CALPERS-for example, CALPERS per-
mits public employees to transfer their pension benefits if they transfer from
one municipal employer to another-but they do not require cities to use
CALPERS. 226 CALPERS, in this sense, competes with private pension ad-
ministrators. In this regime, to allow California law to elevate claims from
CALPERS but not from private pension administrators would allow Califor-
nia to protect CALPERS' financial claims in the event of a municipal
bankruptcy.
In contrast, if all California municipalities had to use CALPERS, then
the protection of CALPERS in municipal bankruptcy could be interpreted as
protecting the CALPERS pension administrative system more broadly. This
would not be simply protecting CALPERS' financial interests in the event of
a municipal bankruptcy, but it would also serve to protect the integrity of the
public pension system. The court's analysis suggests that this distinction
222 Id. at 57.
223 See id. at 52.
224 See id. at 54.
225 Id. at 54-55.
226 See id.
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might color the analysis of whether the California pension laws were "politi-
cal or governmental" in nature.
2. Detroit
Detroit, like Pontiac just twenty miles away, was placed under the con-
trol of an emergency manager. Unlike Pontiac, though, the governor author-
ized the emergency manager to seek relief under Chapter 9 of the
Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy law was perceived to be necessary, in part, to
address the city's roughly $3.5 billion unfunded pension obligations.2 2 7 The
Michigan constitution protects such pension obligations as contractual in na-
ture, meaning that state law efforts to reduce those obligations would be
subject to challenge under the Contracts Clause.228 Bankruptcy law, then,
presented the only legal tool to impose pension reductions.
One of the main issues in the case was whether the Michigan constitu-
tional pension protections could in fact be overridden by the bankruptcy
laws. As in Stockton's case, the Detroit court invoked the language of the
Great Divide Model, making it appear that the interaction of federal and
state law in this context is straightforward. But a closer look at the court's
analysis reveals more complex competing concerns between federal
supremacy and state sovereignty. The bankruptcy court held that the treat-
ment of pension claims is governed by federal bankruptcy law, thus displac-
ing the Michigan state constitutional protections for pension debt.229 While
Michigan had the power to elect whether to invoke federal bankruptcy law,
it did not have the power to change those bankruptcy laws:
Stated another way, state law cannot reorder the distributional pri-
orities of the bankruptcy code. If the state consents to a municipal
bankruptcy, it consents to the application of Chapter 9 of the bank-
ruptcy code . . . . A state cannot rely on the § 903 reservation of
state power to condition or to qualify, i.e., to 'cherry pick,' the
application of the Bankruptcy Code provisions that apply in Chap-
ter 9 cases after such a case has been filed.230
Federal law, according to the court, has an exclusive power over the adjust-
ment of Detroit's debts.
Despite the court's adherence to the debt-governance paradigm, the
court nonetheless found that state laws could guide the application of federal
222 See In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 113-14 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013) (showing that
this amount was subject to some dispute, with some groups arguing the figure was as low as
one billion dollars).
221 MI. CONsT. art. 9, § 24 ("The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and
retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation
thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.").
221 See City of Detroit, 504 B.R. at 150 ("Bekins makes it clear, however, that with state
consent, the adjustment of municipal debts does not impermissibly intrude on state
sovereignty.").
23 0 Id. at 161.
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bankruptcy law. While bankruptcy law permitted Detroit to impair pension
obligations despite the state constitutional protections, those pension protec-
tions were nonetheless relevant in determining the relative priority of the
pension claims under the unfair discrimination test. Ultimately, through the
plan of adjustment, the court permitted Detroit to favor pensioners over the
objecting unsecured creditors, thereby effectively recognizing a de facto pri-
ority for pension obligations.231 In the end, pensioners received at least sev-
enty percent of their claims, while many bondholders received less than ten
percent.23 2 Even though both groups of creditors shared the same legal status
as unsecured creditors and the plan discriminated in favor of pensioners, the
court found that such discrimination was fair, based on the circumstances of
the case-including the Michigan constitutional protection for pension
obligations.233
Accordingly, despite the earlier ruling that Michigan state law could not
re-order bankruptcy priorities, the court found that this constitutional protec-
tion was entitled to "substantial consideration and deference" in determining
the relative treatment of pensioners to other classes of creditors holding le-
gally similar claims against the city.23 4
This brief description of this one slice of Detroit's bankruptcy illustrates
that federalism issues in municipal bankruptcy are not a zero-sum game-
while bankruptcy law may override an absolute state pension protection law,
state law remains relevant in shaping the treatment of pension holders. Mat-
ters that fall within the hybrid financial/governance region may be subject to
both federal and state regulation.
C. Summary
These case studies reveal the dominance of the Great Divide Model in
framing municipal bankruptcy issues; however, these cases illustrate the de-
scriptive shortcomings of this model. The courts accepted the framework
that debt adjustment matters fall within the exclusive domain of the federal
bankruptcy laws. They used language that either explicitly or implicitly gave
federal bankruptcy law a monopoly over debt-related matters. At the same
time, though, the courts-particularly in Stockton and Detroit-recognized
that debt adjustment matters may have important governance implications.
Accordingly, state law may play an important role in debt adjustment
matters.
2' See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 272 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
232 See id. at 180.
233 See id. at 257.
234 Id.
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III. FAILURES OF THE GREAT DIVIDE MODEL
The previous parts have identified the sovereignty concerns underlying
the debt-governance divide, explained how that divide is built into the statu-
tory structure of the municipal bankruptcy laws, and illustrated how this
debt-governance divide has been strained in the recent municipal insolvency
cnsis.
This part identifies the problems with the way the debt-governance di-
vide has been applied. The formalistic approach reflected in much of the
academic literature and cited in the recent municipal bankruptcy cases rests
on a framework that envisions bankruptcy law as exclusively a federal
power, overlooking the role of the state to regulate insolvency. Having
drawn a line between the federal and state powers, this approach simply
requires a court to place municipal restructuring matters in one of these two
spheres. Political/governmental matters fit in the state sphere of power; fi-
nancial matters fit in the federal. As the cases above highlight, however,
many municipal obligations have elements of both-which courts have rec-
ognized but have struggled to operationalize.
This part critically examines both of these elements, first examining the
notion of federal monopoly over bankruptcy and then the notion of separate
debt and governance spheres. It then looks to the early Supreme Court cases
of Ashton and Bekins and the federalism jurisprudence of that era as the
source of this formalistic approach.
A. Uniformity and Exclusivity
Even though courts have often cited the general principle that Congress
has the exclusive power to enact bankruptcy legislation, this is not precisely
true.235 First, it overstates the significance of the Bankruptcy Clause. As dis-
cussed supra in Part I.A, despite the Bankruptcy Clause's use of the phrase
"uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies," this does not mean that the
Constitution deprived states of their power to pass insolvency laws.236 Sec-
ond, even to the extent the federal bankruptcy laws preempt conflicting state
laws under the Supremacy Clause, such a broad statement overstates the
scope of "the subject of bankruptcies" for preemption purposes. While the
Court has never struck down a bankruptcy law as outside the scope of the
bankruptcy power, it has also left intact state insolvency laws except to the
extent those laws would purport to discharge indebtedness.237 Thus, states
235 See Lubben, supra note 140.
236 See also discussion of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122 (1819) and its progeny,
supra Part I.D.1.
237 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
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continue to have debtor-creditor laws that function remarkably similar to
federal bankruptcy law.23 8
Congress's bankruptcy power, then, can hardly be described as creating
a uniform system for regulating debtor-creditor relations, and in the munici-
pal bankruptcy context the claim to federal uniformity is even weaker. First,
as described above, Congress cannot impose municipal bankruptcy laws on
the states; rather, the states must opt in to the Chapter 9 system.239 Currently,
only twenty-four states currently have opt-in legislation.240 Even in these
states, the law places many conditions on this authorization.241 Thus, Chapter
9 has not created a uniform system of insolvency and-assuming some sort
of state authorization is constitutionally mandated242 -it is prohibited from
doing so.
Second, even as to states that have opted in to the Chapter 9 system,
there may be significant differences in outcomes, based on state-level treat-
ment of property rights.243 This is true at some level in bankruptcy law gener-
ally-particularly as general bankruptcy law permits consumer debtors to
look to state law in order to determine which assets it can shield from credi-
tor collection.2" But, at least in that system, there is a uniform procedure-
all that "uniformity" constitutionally requires.245 That is, even though state
exemption laws differ, the bankruptcy law is "uniform" in that it consist-
ently looks to state law for all debtors no matter where located.246 In munici-
pal bankruptcy, there is not even a uniform procedure for incorporating state
law. Courts may look to state law in determining equitable priorities or in
determining whether to otherwise honor state priority laws.
The uniformity arguments, therefore, greatly overstate the case. Con-
gress's power is not exclusive, and the municipal bankruptcy laws do not
create a uniform system for handling municipal insolvency-and, in fact,
238 See Andrew B. Dawson, Better than Bankruptcy?, RUTG. L.J. (forthcoming 2017);
Ronald Mann, An Empirical Investigation of Liquidation Choices of Failed High Tech Firms,
82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1375 (2004); Edward R. Morrison, Bargaining Around Bankruptcy: Small
Business Workouts and State Law, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 255, 257 (2009) (all discussing the use
of state law "assignment for the benefit of creditors" proceedings as a bankruptcy alternative).
239 See supra Part I.B. 1.
240 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7.
241 See id.
242 See Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL'Y 81, 108 (2012) (arguing that jurisprudential developments since Ashton and
Bekins call into question whether state authorization is constitutionally required); see also
Dmiszewicki, supra note 77.
243 See Ponoroff, supra note 43, at 355 ("[E]ver since the first long-standing federal bank-
ruptcy law was enacted in 1898, state law has continued to play a vital interstitial role in
defining the commercial rights, interests and entitlements of participants in the bankruptcy
case.").
244 See id.
245 See Hanover Nat. Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 189 (1902); Judith Schenck Koffler,
The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexamination of the Doctrine of Geographic
Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 22 (1983).
246 See Koffler, supra note 245, at 45-46 (describing the "Moyses view that the constitu-
tional stricture only requires a form of geographic uniformity that permits distinctions based
upon state boundaries").
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may be constitutionally prohibited from doing so, as states must choose to
opt in to Chapter 9 bankruptcy relief.
B. Debt-Governance Dichotomy
The formalistic application of the Great Divide Model, after having
identified the spheres of state and federal power, requires courts to place
matters within one of those spheres. If a matter is political or governmental,
then it belongs in the realm of state control; if it is financial, it belongs in the
federal sphere.
As described above, though, there are many matters that have both po-
litical/governmental and financial elements. Any time a municipal debtor,
for example, issues debt in order to fund public services, there would be a
significant overlap between governance and finance matters. The most
prominent example would be contractual obligations with municipal em-
ployees, as these contracts create financial obligations and enable the provi-
sion of public services. As the Detroit court recognized, the public pension
obligations, while financial, have an important "mission-related" function.247
The Great Divide Model fails to provide an analytical framework for
considering the role of federal and state law in resolving disputes in this
hybrid debt-governance region. Even worse, this model works to obscure
how courts actually analyze these matters. Its analytical framework calls for
matters to be either in the federal or the state spheres, when in fact these
spheres have significant overlap-and both federal and state law may apply
in resolving such matters.
C. Limiting Principles
A final failure of the Great Divide Model is that it is highly susceptible
to manipulation. The formalist approach relies on a bright-line distinction
between debt and governance, and bright line tests may be easily side-
stepped. Thus, a bankruptcy court might exercise considerable control over
municipal governance under the guise of debt restructuring. As long as the
court is operating in the realm of financial reorganization, there is little to
push back against such federal intrusion.
As noted above, scholars have long noted that bankruptcy courts may
be able to exercise significant indirect control over municipal governance.
McConnell and Picker explored this issue in considering how a court could
exercise "judicial control by a wink and a nod," as a court could refuse to
confirm a plan unless, for example, the city promised to raise taxes.248 Gil-
lette points out that courts may exercise control over not only how a city
may exit bankruptcy but also on whether it may enter bankruptcy. For exam-
ple, in determining whether the municipality is indeed "insolvent," the court
247 In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147, 257 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014).
248 McConnell & Picker, supra note 23, at 474.
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has discretion to consider whether the city might in fact be able to pay its
debts by first raising taxes.249
Melissa Jacoby's recent work analyzing the Detroit bankruptcy illus-
trates that the potential for federal control is even greater than previously
appreciated.2 5 0 This begins with the unique judicial selection process in
Chapter 9, in which the chief judge of the circuit court of appeals is empow-
ered to appoint the Chapter 9 judge-a process that, she argues, "offers an
opportunity for the bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts to discuss a phi-
losophy for, and collaborate on, management of the case."251 The court's
ability to then manage the case through confidential mediation, to enlist ex-
perts and create teams to assist with the court's duties, and to involve Detroit
residents in the decision-making process all expanded the court's powers be-
yond the traditional account-and beyond the formalist structure of the debt-
governance divide.252 This expansion leads Jacoby to conclude that the statu-
tory restraints on judicial interference with local governance are ineffective:
even though the Detroit court actually may have been "literally consistent"
with the statutory restraints, she argues that these statutory restraints "are
not nearly as robust as is often claimed."253
Whereas Jacoby's analysis of the Detroit Blueprint sees "wink and a
nod" judicial interference as inconsistent with the structure of Chapter 9 and
potentially problematic from a federalism perspective, Gillette and Skeel
view this as an opening for even more federal intervention.2 5 4 If Courts can
indirectly require municipal debtors to raise taxes, they suggest that courts
could be authorized to do so directly. That is, if the statutory structure invites
indirect interference, the non-interference principle must not be constitution-
ally mandated. It reflects, instead, a policy preference-a preference that,
they argue, prevents bankruptcy from "fixing" bankrupt municipalities.255
Gillette and Skeel's argument reflects the concern that without a strong
bankruptcy power states may lack the incentive or the practical ability to
truly rehabilitate cities.256 Governance reform may involve unpopular politi-
249 Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, supra note 13, at 293 (citing as an example the eligibility
determination of Bridgeport, Connecticut).
2s0 Jacoby, supra note 24.
251 Id. at 73.
252 See id. at 99.
253 Id. at 104-05.
254 Compare Jacoby, supra note 24, at 105 ("I have uncovered no evidence that Congress
adopted this language with a wink or nod to courts that they should exercise control through
other means."), with Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1200 (noting that their proposal for
bankruptcy oversight of operational restructuring "is less radical than it initially appears,"
because, in part, "it is commonly recognized that bankruptcy courts have the capacity to do
indirectly what they cannot do directly by refusing to confirm plans that do not include details
such as tax increases that the municipality might otherwise reject").
255 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1165-66 (noting that Chapter 9 reflects "congres-
sional concern with constitutional limitations on federal diminution of state sovereignty in
Chapter 9 proceedings" but hat such diminution would not actually "run afoul of constitu-
tional principles").
256 Id. at 1155 ("We share McConnell and Picker's intuition that relief for fiscally dis-
tressed municipalities necessarily requires more than debt reduction.").
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cal decisions, effectively deterring city leaders from enacting reforms that
would benefit the city in the long term without any benefit to the leaders.25 7
They cite as an example the ability of the District of Columbia Financial
Control Board to make politically necessary but unpopular reforms.258 For-
mer Washington, D.C. mayor Marion Barry, for example, noted that the fed-
erally appointed financial control board was able to take reform measures
that he politically would have been unable to do.259 Even when reforms are
politically palatable, they may not be attainable due to municipalities' frag-
mented decision-making structure.260 Such a structure may invite fiscal poli-
cies that benefit some of the decision makers but that deplete the municipal
fisc-effectively creating a tragedy of the commons situation.261 Unless
there is a strong third party with the authority to restructure the city's gov-
ernance, Gillette and Skeel argue that internal politics is unlikely to fix such
problems.
Gillette and Skeel urge that a bankruptcy court can and should be that
third party.26 2 Giving this power to a bankruptcy court can solve the
problems of fragmented decision-making structures.263 And it can solve the
problem of politically unpopular reforms, as a strong bankruptcy power may
permit states to offload these decisions on to the court.26
Gillette and Skeel's work, along with that of others, takes important
steps in the right direction towards developing an alternative model to under-
standing the tension between state sovereignty and the federal bankruptcy
power. Any alternative model, though, must provide some means to define
the contours of the federal power. For example, as discussed in the following
part, Gillette and Skeel would give more power to bankruptcy courts to
shape governance reform, but they recognize that there may be constitutional
limitations to that power. Their work, while an insightful critique of the no-
tion that the Great Divide Model is constitutionally mandated, does not give
us a systematic theoretical framework within which to evaluate those limits.
The same is true in considering the implications of the indirect control
Jacoby has identified in the Detroit Blueprint.
IV. BEYOND THE GREAT DIVIDE
As described in the prior part, the formalist Great Divide Model fails
both descriptively and prescriptively. It obscures the judicial decision-mak-
ing process behind formal labels of "debt" and "governance," and it
257 See id. at 1195-96.
25 8
1Id. at 1196 n.211.
259 See id.
260 See id. at 1184 ("The most common governance problem ... is a fragmented local
decision-making structure.").
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provides little guidance for analyzing federalism issues in municipal insol-
vency. While this paradigm may provide a useful heuristic for understanding
the basic structure of municipal bankruptcy laws, it fails to provide a struc-
ture to analyze the role of both the federal and state governments in this
sphere. Further, the Great Divide Model fails to connect with modern feder-
alism jurisprudence, from which it could draw important principles as to the
key question of the limits of federal control.
The Great Divide Model is rooted in the Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence of the Ashton era, analyzing federalism questions as one of allocation:
the municipal bankruptcy power must either belong in the federal sphere or
the state sphere.265 This model has been described as one of "dual federal-
ism." 2 6 6 The Court began moving away from dual federalism at the same
time as it upheld the revised municipal bankruptcy laws in Bekins.267
Even though the Court's federalism jurisprudence has largely moved
away from the highly formalistic dual federalism model, discussions of mu-
nicipal bankruptcy federalism remain rooted in the allocative, formalist
Great Divide Model. In some sense, this is not unique to municipal bank-
ruptcy, as others have lamented that the dual federalism model continues to
"haunt" modem federalism jurisprudence.2 68 In municipal bankruptcy, this
adherence to an old model of federalism may reflect, in part, the dearth of
municipal bankruptcy cases. Such cases have historically been rare and, until
recently, have involved public utilities more often than cities or counties.269
Thus, the Court has not revisited these federalism issues in a constitutional
context since Faitoute in 1946.270
This adherence to a dual federalist-type model in municipal bankruptcy
may also reflect the lack of a theory of bankruptcy federalism more broadly.
Since Bekins, the bankruptcy power has grown significantly, and the Court
has not provided any serious limitation on that power. 271 Instead, it has
265 Ernest Young, Federalism as a Constitutional Principle, 83 U. CIN. L. REv. 1057,
1065 (2015) [hereinafter Young, Federalism] ("Enumerated powers gave rise to a model of
federalism doctrine called 'dual federalism,' and it worked well enough for the first century
and a half of our history. The grant of certain powers to the national government and the
reservation of the rest to the States created two separate and exclusive spheres of regulatory
jurisdiction.").
266 Id.
267 See id. at 1067 (noting that "the constitutional model of dual federalism died out
around 1937, a casualty of the Supreme Court's 'switch in time' that staved off FDR's court
packing plan by ending the Court's resistance to the New Deal.").
261 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 818
(1998) ("The problem is that the Court's jurisprudence is still haunted by a theory of state
autonomy it inherited from nineteenth-century jurisprudence-a theory that I call nationalistic
dual federalism.").
269 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1183 (noting scarcity of bankruptcies involving
substantial cities).
270 See generally Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
271 See KLEE, supra at note 73, at 126-29 ("[T]he Court has refused to define the outer
limits of the 'subject of bankruptcies.'").
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defined the core of the bankruptcy power extremely broadly as dealing with
the "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations."272 Scholars have attempted
to draw limits to the bankruptcy power, but overall the conclusion has gener-
ally been that bankruptcy is just different.2 7 3
The Great Divide Model both reflects and reinforces this notion of
bankruptcy exceptionalism. To the extent this formalism is justifiable, it is
because bankruptcy federalism must be different. The Great Divide Model's
formalism perpetuates this notion of exceptionalism because it isolates bank-
ruptcy federalism questions from broader principles of federalism. In this
sense, the Great Divide Model's formalism obscures the constitutional issues
in municipal bankruptcy and these issues from the broader federalism juris-
prudential principles needed to analyze them. This creates significant
problems in evaluating the difficult issues that have arisen in Detroit, Stock-
ton, and other municipal bankruptcies. It also fails to create a framework to
analyze proposals, such as that of Gillette and Skeel, to expand the powers
of judges in municipal bankruptcy.27 4
This part of the article argues that municipal bankruptcy federalism is
better understood under a functional model-one that considers the function
of the municipal bankruptcy laws and that of the state laws with which it
interacts. This approach recognizes that municipal bankruptcy will necessa-
rily interfere with the contractual relationships of a bankrupt municipality
with its creditors, and that interference may have consequences for the mu-
nicipality's ability to provide services. However, that interference is limited
to the goal of restructuring the municipality's finances. If the state consents
to federal bankruptcy interference, the municipal bankruptcy laws may dis-
place state laws in this process, but hat displacement is not absolute. States
retain the power to control governance matters, subject of course to federal
bankruptcy supremacy. This functional model is consistent with the Court's
jurisprudential shift from Ashton (rejecting the first municipal bankruptcy
law) to Bekins (upholding the revised municipal bankruptcy law). It is con-
sistent with the way the courts in Stockton and Detroit ultimately analyzed
the interaction of bankruptcy law with state pension protection laws. And it
272 Stern v. Marshall, 574 U.S. 462, 475 (2011) (quoting N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80 n.31 (1982)) ("From the beginning, the 'core' of federal
bankruptcy proceedings has been 'the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations."').
273 See Daniel Austin, The Bankruptcy Clause and the Eleventh Amendments: An Uncer-
tain Boundary Between Federalism and State Sovereignty, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 383 (2007);
Ralph Brubaker, Explaining Katz's New Bankruptcy Exception to State Sovereign Immunity:
The Bankruptcy Power as a Federal Forum Power, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 95 (2007);
Jonathan C. Lipson, Debt and Democracy: Towards a Constitutional Theory of Bankruptcy, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 605 (2008); Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1063 (2002); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors' Rights in
Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy
Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973-1031 (1983) (challenging the accepted proposition of reorgani-
zation law that the Fifth Amendment limits "the extent to which secured creditors may be
subjected to the risk of loss due to restraint of their foreclosure rights").
274 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6.
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is consistent with how the Court's federalism jurisprudence has moved away
from dual federalism's allocative model. Understanding municipal bank-
ruptcy federalism in a functional manner provides a framework for identify-
ing the issues of federal control in municipal bankruptcy. And connecting
municipal bankruptcy federalism with broader principles of federalism helps
to provide the tools to analyze these issues. In particular, it provides a way
for considering the "Detroit Blueprint" for courts to indirectly control local
governance and for the proposal by Gillette and Skeel to permit courts to
exercise more direct control over local governance. Finally, this part con-
cludes by considering how this framework underscores the need to read the
Court's recent Puerto Rico case narrowly.
A. Functional Analysis of Municipal Bankruptcy Federalism
This section argues that a functional model of municipal bankruptcy
federalism comports with the Court's decision in Bekins. It better describes
the way courts have analyzed the interaction of federal and state laws in the
context of public pension debt. And it provides a more workable framework
for courts to consider the intersection of federal bankruptcy and state laws.
1. Re-Examining Ashton and Bekins
Reviewing Ashton"' (in which the Court struck down the first munici-
pal bankruptcy law) and Bekins276 (in which the Court upheld the revised
municipal bankruptcy law), one can observe a jurisprudential shift, however
slight, from a formalistic model to a more functionalist model. This shift,
more than any particular changes in the revisions made to the original 1934
Act, helps explain the Court's decision upholding the revised 1937 Act in
Bekins.277 This shift provides the initial support for the functionalist approach
advocated in this article.
Whereas Ashton focused on the dual federalism model in which the
states have non-delegable control over their own municipalities, in Bekins
the Court moved away from this model, instead focusing on the federal-state
cooperative framework for resolving municipal distress. Ashton found mu-
nicipal bankruptcy law to be unconstitutional because bankruptcy would
necessarily invite some federal intrusion into municipal governance, which
would unconstitutionally surrender state sovereignty and expand the powers
of Congress.278 Bekins, in contrast, embraced this notion of the state inviting
275 298 U.S. 513 (2012).
276 304 U.S. 27 (2012).
277 See Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6.
278 Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) ("Neither
consent nor submission by the states can enlarge the powers of Congress; none can exist
except those which are granted. The sovereignty of the state essential to its proper functioning
under the Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it cannot be taken away by any form of
legislation.") (citations omitted).
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(limited) federal intrusion: "Nor did the formation of an indestructible
Union of indestructible States make impossible cooperation between the Na-
tion and the States through the exercise of the power of each to the advan-
tage of the people who are citizens of both."2 79
This is not to say the Court rejected the basic premise that states have
the right to control their municipalities and Congress has the right to pass
federal bankruptcy laws. Indeed, the Court recognized the issue of state con-
trol over municipalities as inherent in state sovereignty. But, the Court rec-
ognized that state sovereignty did not preclude states from inviting a federal-
state solution to municipal insolvency. That is, the question of whether fed-
eral law can restructure municipal debt is not whether that power falls within
the federal sphere of power or that of the states; rather, it is a question of
whether the Constitution permits a shared sphere wherein the federal and
state governments can work together to create a solution to municipal insol-
vency. The Court answered this question in the affirmative because it found
the power to enhance the state's control over its municipalities.
2. Federal-State Law Interaction in Chapter 9: Pension Obligations
Consistent with the Bekins description of municipal bankruptcy law as
a cooperative effort between the federal and state governments, a functional
model of municipal bankruptcy law permits courts to view federalism issues
in this context as something more than an all-or-nothing, federal-or-state law
decision. The interaction of federal and state law in this context is not a zero-
sum game, wherein either federal or state law applies; rather, both federal
and state law may work together in resolving municipal distress.
This subsection re-examines the courts' treatment of pension obligations
in Detroit and Stockton as an illustration of this functional approach. As seen
in those cases, the treatment of pension obligations-which, as discussed
supra have both financial and governance elements-was not wholly gov-
erned by federal or state law; rather, both federal and state law worked in
tandem in determining the rights of pensioners. It then considers how this
functional approach can provide a framework for considering the limits of
federal interference in municipal governance, as illustrated in Jacoby's "De-
troit Blueprint" and as advocated by Gillette and Skeel's proposal for greater
federal control in this context.
Although the courts in Detroit and Stockton both proclaimed a formal-
istic analysis when faced with the question of whether a city can restructure
pension debts despite state law protections, the courts' analyses are better
understood as applying a functional approach. The pension question in both
Detroit and Stockton was whether bankruptcy law overrides state pension
protections. Under the Great Divide Model, the problem would be framed as
one of allocation: bankruptcy law governs debt adjustment and debt adjust-
ment includes creditor distributions, bankruptcy law therefore providing the
27' Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53.
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exclusive rule for creditor distributions. Under a functional approach, the
question does not require an all or nothing answer. State pension protection
laws may survive preemption, in whole or in part, in accordance with their
function as financial or political in nature.
Both the Detroit and Stockton courts framed the issue within the Great
Divide Model; however, their analysis of the issue is better understood
through a functional lens. In Detroit, despite the court's statements that bank-
ruptcy law overrides Michigan's constitutional protection for pension obliga-
tions, the court ultimately approved a plan that paid significantly more to
pensioners than to general unsecured creditors, even though the claims of
both groups shared legal priority. 28 0 The court's reasoning relied on the gov-
ernmental function of the pension obligations: the City's mission is to pro-
vide public services; employees and retirees are essential to perform those
services; pension obligations are a core platform of the City's relationship
with those employees and retirees; therefore, the treatment of pension obli-
gations is governmental in nature.281 At the same time, though, the court still
permitted some modifications to the pension obligations, recognizing that
these were financial in nature as well. In fact, the court suggests the City's
plan. would have failed the feasibility test but for those pension
modifications.28 2
The Stockton court likewise framed the issue in a very formalistic way,
first ascribing exclusive power to the federal government to address munici-
pal insolvency, then concluding that the bankruptcy laws preempt the Cali-
fornia pension protection laws.283 But the court then turned to a more
functional analysis of some of those pension protection laws, particularly
whether the state law prohibited the use of bankruptcy to reject pension ser-
vicing agreements with CALPERS.2 84 The court considered whether those
protections were financial or operational. The laws could conceivably be
operational if they were designed to protect the integrity of the California
state pension system.285 That might have been the case if California required
all municipalities to use CALPERS for pension servicing. But, as the court
noted, California permits municipalities to use private pension servicers. The
court concluded that CALPERS was competing in a private market and act-
ing as a private enterprise. Any protection for CALPERS reflected a state
law decision related to public finance, not public services. In that way, the
state law pension protection was effectively as if the State had sought to
2(" See In re City of Detroit, 524 B.R. 147 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2014). Although the pri-
mary fight in Detroit was between pensioners and bondholders, the city ultimately settled the
bondholder claims, leaving only the general unsecured claims and those in the "convenience"
class of creditors, defined as those unsecured claims of $25,000 or less.
281 See id.
282 See id. at 231 (quoting from the court's feasibility expert, Martha Kopacz, whose report
noted that "[t]he City must be continually mindful that a root cause of the financial troubles it
now experiences is the failure to properly address future pension obligations").
2113 See In re City of Stockton, 526 B.R. 35, 62 (Bankr. E.D. Cal.), aff'd in part, dismissed
in part, 542 B.R. 261 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2015).
2114 See id. at 61.
285 See id.
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allow municipalities to file bankruptcy but not to impair obligations owed to
the state.286
When viewing the question of pension protections through this func-
tional lens, it is possible to balance the federal bankruptcy power with the
states' governance/political function, thus maintaining the federalism balance
upheld in Bekins. Such an approach is necessarily fact-intensive. It requires
examining the function of Michigan's constitutional pension protections and
of California's public pension laws. A court would need to look at the origins
of those protections and the role these protections play in the State's human
resource management, as well as the Municipality's anticipated ability to
fulfill its pension obligations. For example, the court might consider whether
the pension protection was newly enacted, whether municipal employees are
covered by the Social Security Act, and whether the pension obligations
were reasonable in structure.
Ultimately, the functional analysis still requires evaluating state laws as
serving both governmental and financial purpose. However, it recognizes
that laws may serve both purposes. The functional approach leaves room for
such hybrid laws to influence bankruptcy outcomes-these laws are neither
excluded from preemption nor entirely displaced by federal law; rather, they
may work alongside federal law. The state law pension protections may not
override bankruptcy law, but at the same time they may be able to work
alongside federal bankruptcy law in order to protect the state's sovereignty
interests.
Accordingly, a functional approach recognizes that municipal bank-
ruptcy federalism is not a zero-sum game where federal law preempts state
laws or does not. Indeed, the rejection of a zero-sum approach is implicit in
Bekins. That case emphasized that state consent legitimizes a federal role in
the governance of municipal insolvency because that federal role works not
to diminish states' control over their own municipalities but to bolster it.
Underlying the court's approach to Michigan's pension protection laws was
the fact that Michigan's consent legitimized some federal intrusion into gov-
ernance matters, but such consent did not render irrelevant state law priori-
ties. Rather, state priorities that are plausibly vital to governance matters
may play a significant role. At the same time, as recognized in Stockton, not
all state laws have such a governance function. State laws that serve, for
example, to insulate state debts from a bankruptcy discharge may serve a
principally financial motive. There is a role for the bankruptcy court to deter-
mine whether state laws play a vital governance role or whether accommo-
dating state law would inflict unacceptable costs to federal bankruptcy
policy.
This approach-which looks to the compatibility of federal and state
interests-distinguishes municipal-bankruptcy federalism from the Court's
286 See id. at 57 ("[S]pecial insulation of a state actor in a municipal insolvency is con-
trary to chapter 9 precedent.") (citing Mission Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas, 116 F.2d 175, 178
(5th Cir. 1940)).
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analysis of federalism under the Tax Clause as it relates to intergovernmental
immunity and the Commerce Clause as it relates to areas of exclusive state
power. When examining the limits of federal power in those doctrinal areas,
the Court has expressed uneasiness with tests based on whether the federal
power would intrude upon traditional governmental functions of the state.287
The difficulty of drawing constitutional distinctions between a state's tradi-
tional governmental functions and its nontraditional proprietary functions in
setting limits to federal authority inevitably puts the courts in the position of
picking and choosing among state governance priorities-a role that is pro-
foundly inconsistent with federalism.288
The blurriness of the distinctions may be as notable in the bankruptcy
context as in the context of intergovernmental tax immunity or Commerce
Clause doctrine. But that matters far less in the municipal bankruptcy con-
text. For one thing, the distinction between a municipality's private and pub-
lic functions is congressionally sanctioned: it is built into the statutory
structure of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code. Moreover, taking Bekins's
insight to heart, the distinction is state-sanctioned in any case that comes
before the court. And finally, to a degree that is not always present in these
other federalism contexts, the judicial outcome need not be binary; rather,
there is room for both state and federal law to work together.
3. Federal-State Law Interaction: Federal Intrusion
This functional approach also helps to highlight the federalism concerns
identified in Melissa Jacoby's analysis of judicial control in the Detroit
Bankruptcy-what she terms the "Detroit Blueprint," whereby courts may
indirectly assert control over municipal governance.289 Not only can bank-
ruptcy courts indirectly control bankrupt municipalities through the plan
confirmation requirements, as noted first by McConnell and Picker, but they
can assert control over municipalities through a myriad of procedural and
"below the radar" tactics.290
Jacoby's analysis on this dynamic is primarily descriptive; however, she
voices skepticism that this "wink and a nod" control is consistent with
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.291 Sections 903 and 904 attempt to define
the limits of federal control in Chapter 9, first by reserving powers to the
287 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1946) (describing as
"untenable" an intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine "derived from such untenable crite-
ria as 'proprietary' against 'governmental' activities of the States, or historically sanctioned
activities of Government or activities conducted merely for profit"); see also discussion of
Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery and Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., infra notes
304-10.
288 See discussion of Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery and Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority, infra notes 304-10.
289 Jacoby, supra note 24.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 105 ("I have uncovered no evidence that Congress adopted this language with a
wink or nod to courfs that they should exercise control through other means . . . . Whatever
benefits might flow from a more experimental system, the history of section 904 does not
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states and then by limiting the power of the bankruptcy court.2 92 Since Con-
gress created statutory safeguards to prohibit direct interference, is it really
safe to assume that Congress intended to permit indirect interference?
The problem she identifies is easily swept under the rug under a formal-
ist system: the court did not directly contravene the statutory prohibitions.
Therefore, there is no need for concern. As long as the court is operating
within the federal sphere of debt restructuring, there is no problem. Or, as
long as the court is exercising its case management discretion, there is like-
wise no concern with federal intrusion in state sovereignty. Such a categori-
cal approach avoids confronting the important and challenging question of
how far a federal court may reach without upsetting the constitutional bal-
ance of the municipal bankruptcy laws.
When municipal-bankruptcy federalism is understood as operating to
support state sovereignty while respecting federal supremacy, we can no
longer treat bankruptcy court control over governance matters-either under
the guise of debt restructuring or case management-as an anomaly to be
swept under the rug or an error to be definitively rejected. Municipal bank-
ruptcy law has long been concerned with preserving state control over mu-
nicipal governance and operational restructuring. It has purposely been
narrowly tailored to remain flexible enough to be a useful tool for states to
address municipal insolvency. At the same time, though, beginning with
Congress's response to Faitoute, such flexibility operates within the con-
straints of federal primacy-which Congress has asserted through its efforts
to create a uniform system for resolving municipal insolvency.
In short, faced with increasing bankruptcy courts' authority over opera-
tional restructuring, the Great Divide Model invites either an overreaction
(no federal intrusion at all is permissible) or an under-reaction (federal intru-
sion is fine, so long as it is under the guise of financial restructuring). In
contrast, a functionalist approach recognizes that such a shift towards greater
court authority is indeed a dramatic one, but one worth careful consideration.
An aggrandized federal role may pose problems, but it also offers the poten-
tial for a constructive, cooperative federal-state solution to municipal
insolvency.
B. Federalism Limitations on Bankruptcy Court Interference
A functional lens not only helps to highlight how federal bankruptcy
court interference is inconsistent with Chapter 9's history and structure, but it
also helps to connect municipal bankruptcy federalism with broader princi-
ples of federalism jurisprudence. Modern federalism jurisprudence moves
beyond a formalist categorical exercise, presenting instead a more nuanced
understanding of federal-state interaction in various regulatory arenas. This
suggest that Congress intended to create such a laboratory, particularly one that does not con-
tain a mechanism for systematic evaluation.").
292 11 U.S.C. §§ 903, 904 (2012).
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section is not intended as an exhaustive discussion of the Court's federalism
jurisprudence, nor is it intended to demystify bankruptcy exceptionalism. In-
stead, this section has the more modest goal of considering how federalism
doctrine may help frame the issues of municipal bankruptcy federalism.
The Great Divide Model's allocation of powers to either the federal or
the state sphere reflects the "dual federalism" model of federalism embraced
by the Court prior to the New Deal "switch in time." 293 "Dual federalism"
sought to allocate powers as belonging either to the federal or the state gov-
ernments, with a sense that some powers were "local" and others "na-
tional." 29 4 This model of federalism was premised on a state of the world in
which courts could draw a line between these different spheres-an exercise
that became increasingly difficult as these spheres overlapped.295 The role of
courts in this model was to determine whether a power in question belonged
in one sphere or the other.296
As noted by scholars in this field, this dual federalism model failed to
capture federal-state interaction in regulatory regimes.297 Not only does it fail
descriptively to capture federal-state relations in many regulatory areas, but
it also fails prescriptively in that it provides little useful guidance for mea-
suring when federal regulation has intruded too much into state sover-
eignty.29 8 Finally, as argued by cooperative federalism scholars, traditional
notions of federalism are simply inapt when evaluating the myriad federal
regulatory programs that do not displace states from the regulatory sphere
but instead employ states within federal regulatory programs.299 Many fed-
eral regulatory programs-e.g., environmental, energy, election, and tele-
communications regulations-involve cooperative frameworks that are best
understood not under a model of dual sovereigns but of master-servant.3 "
The "last gasp" of dual federalism0 was articulated in National
League of Cities v. Usery, a case examining the application of amendments
293 See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1950);
Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federal Principle, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1629, 1636 (2006); Young, Federalism, supra note 265, at 1067 (noting that "the constitu-
tional model of dual federalism died out around 1937, a casualty of the Supreme Court's
'switch in time' that staved off FDR's court packing plan by ending the Court's resistance to the
New Deal").
294 See Young, Federalism, supra note 265, at 1065.
295 See id.
296 See id.
297 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the
Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1692, 1693 (noting the tension between
cooperative regulatory programs and the "dual federalism" model, using the Telecom Act as
an example).
298 See Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV.
4, 13 (2010).
299 Id.
"oo See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621 (2015)
(energy law federalism); Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV.
747 (2016); Weiser, supra note 297 (cooperative federalism in telecommunications).
"o' See Ernest A. Young, Dual Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Af-
fairs Exception, 69 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 139, 149 (2001) (describing the decision as having
"the feel of a 'last gasp' for dual federalism even before it was overruled"); see also Charlton
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to the Fair Labor Standard Act that would extend that act's minimum wage
and maximum hour requirements to state employment agreements.3 02 The
Court reasoned that to interfere with state employment agreements would be
to interfere with states' and local governments' ability to provide traditional
public services.3 03 As such, it held that "insofar as the challenged amend-
ments operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions, they are not within
the authority granted Congress by Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3."3
This "traditional governmental functions" test has been mostly re-
jected; however, the principle behind that test has persisted: traditional gov-
ernmental functions are integral to the notion of state sovereignty. The Court
formally rejected National League of Cities' traditional governmental func-
tions test in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority in 1985,
lamenting that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immu-
nity in terms of 'traditional governmental function' is not only unworkable
but is also inconsistent with established principles of federalism."3 05 Without
an organizing principle to categorize state powers as traditional/non-tradi-
tional governmental functions, National League of Cities' dual federalism
model was simply unworkable. It put unelected federal judges in the position
of determining which state services were sufficiently vital or traditional to
deserve protection from federal interference, and which were not.3 06 As the
Court noted, such a system would invite "unelected federal judiciary to
make decisions about which state policies it favors and which ones it
dislikes."3 07
In contrast, Garcia favored a judicial approach that relied instead on the
"procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system,"
rather "than by judicially created limitations on federal power."3 0s States
could protect themselves against federal intrusion through the political pro-
cess-that is, through their representative role in the federal government.
Thus, the role of the courts was not to draw lines between spheres of power
but to. ensure faithfulness to constitutional political safeguards.3 09
Although Garcia rejected the traditional/non-traditional governmental
function test for limiting federal power, this distinction has retained some
C. Copeland, Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a Relational Lens, 19
WM. & MARY B. RTS. J. 511, 529 (2011).
302 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
303 See id.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
305 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
306 See id. at 546.
307 Id.
30s Id. at 552.
309 See Andrzej Rapaczynksi, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federal-
ism after Garcia, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 341 (1985) ("All that Garcia, on its face, requires is that
a justification of any federalism-related limitation on the national government be one of 'pro-
cess' (rather than relying on the alleged existence of some 'sacred province of state autonomy')
and that the process failure, required for judicial intervention, be on the national level.") (quo-
tations and citation omitted).
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vitality under the "clear statement rule." 10 In Gregory v. Ashcroft, the Court
held that Congress cannot intrude upon "state governmental functions"
without a clear statement of its intent to do so.31' In that case, the Court
considered whether a Missouri mandatory retirement law for state judges
violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Justice
O'Connor noted that, when Congress's intent to preempt is unclear, there is a
presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt state laws "in areas
traditionally regulated by the States."312
The Court also crafted another sovereignty-based limitation on Con-
gress's powers that prohibits Congress from commandeering state govern-
ments.313 In New York v. United States, the Court held that, even though
Congress has the power to regulate the disposal of radioactive waste-even
entirely displacing states from the field through preemption if it so
chooses-Congress may not force states to legislate along lines dictated by
federal regulations.3 14 One of the principal concerns expressed in New York
was one of political accountability." Choosing a location to dispose of radi-
oactive waste can be vitally important but also politically quite unpopular.
As such, there may be a strong incentive for federal officials to force such
unpopular decisions onto state officials in order "to avoid being held ac-
countable to the voters for the choice of location."3 1 6 Likewise, state officials
might be all too happy to avoid accountability by shifting blame on to the
federal government.
The Court later deployed this anti-commandeering principle in striking
down a portion of the Affordable Care Act in National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius.3 17 The Court held that, while Congress can
grant conditional funding to states to encourage compliance with federal
programs, it may not use its spending power to coerce states into compli-
ance." The Court held that the threat to withdraw all Medicaid funding if a
state did not accept the expansion of the program was not a permissible
inducement but "a gun to the head."3 19 Such coercion, according to the ma-
jority, amounts to commandeering, which "would threaten the accountabil-
ity key to our federal system."3 20 Thus, state consent-which is of core
310 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 CoLUM. L. REV.
399, 409 (2010) (noting that Gregory's clear statement rule was erected against he "back-
drop" of National League of Cities' "traditional governmental functions" test "that Garcia
had found inappropriate for Marbury-style judicial review").
' 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1992).
312 Id. at 460.
. See Siegel, supra note 293, at 1636.
314 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
31
1 See id. at 182.1
6 Id. at 182-83.
" 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012); see also Andrew B. Coan, Commandeering, Coercion,
and the Deep Structure of American Federalism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2015) (noting that the
Court "drew an explicit line between Congress's conditional spending power and the anti-
commandeering principle").
318 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
319 Id. at 2604.
320 Id. at 2602.
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importance to municipal bankruptcy laws-may permit the federal govern-
ment to influence and direct state policies. However, that consent must be
truly voluntary and not coerced.
This section by no means exhausts the debates over federalism doctrine.
Its aim is more targeted: to highlight ways in which-once freed from the
formalist Great Divide Model-courts may think more fruitfully about the
limits of federal intrusion into state power, both when a city has filed bank-
ruptcy and when a state has sought to address municipal insolvency under
state law.
1. Re-Thinking the Limits of Federal Bankruptcy Courts' Power
These broader federalism principles help to identify the federalism is-
sues in the municipal bankruptcy context, in particular, those issues that
arise from bankruptcy court control. Specifically, they create a framework
for considering the indirect federal interference of the "Detroit Blueprint"32'
and for considering Gillette and Skeel's proposal for even greater federal
intervention in Chapter 9.322
Using bankruptcy courts to restructure local government structures-
whether indirectly or directly-raises political process concerns of the sort
raised in Garcia. Examining municipal bankruptcy federalism under
process-oriented federalism, the focus should be the legislative process
rather than the substance of the bankruptcy laws. Thus, perhaps there is no
need to worry about federal bankruptcy intrusion into local governance be-
cause the states exercise two layers of political control: (1) the states may
opt out of the municipal bankruptcy laws, and (2) the states may impose
limitations on federal power by amending the bankruptcy laws.
Leaving aside the issue of state consent for the moment and focusing on
the second level of state control-that the states may amend the federal
bankruptcy laws-there may still be procedural problems. It is one thing for
federal law directly to require specific changes to local government struc-
tures in Chapter 9, but a different thing for Congress to delegate that power
to bankruptcy courts. As Johnson and Young point out, when considering the
implications of a theoretical bankruptcy law as applied to the states, "Al-
though Garcia allows Congress to regulate the states' governmental opera-
tions, it is not nearly so clear that Congress may turn over control of state
financial decisions to federal judges."323 If a linchpin of procedural safe-
guards is that the political process may sufficiently protect state interests,
there may be serious concerns about assigning power to apolitical actors. As
expressed in the Garcia dissent, procedural federalism ay overstate the
121 See Jacoby, supra note 24.
322 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6.
323 Emily D. Johnson & Ernest A. Young, The Constitutional Law of State Debt, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 117, 158-59 (2011).
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connection between states and the myriad of unelected civil service employ-
ees that draft federal legislation.3 2 4
These delegation concerns are further complicated by the unique (and
uncertain) status of bankruptcy judges. Unlike Article III judges that are ap-
pointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate, bankruptcy judges are
appointed by the federal courts of appeal to serve fourteen-year terms.3 2 5 On
the one hand, states have an even more attenuated connection with bank-
ruptcy judges than they do with district judges, since they have only the
most minimal control over the appointment of bankruptcy judges. On the
other hand, bankruptcy judges do not enjoy the life tenure and salary protec-
tions Article III judges possess.3 26 Congress thus has greater power to re-
move bankruptcy judges, providing more control over the bankruptcy
judiciary than over other federal judges.3 27
A second constitutional concern arises from the anti-commandeering
cases. As recognized by Gillette and Skeel, this may be a serious obstacle to
court involvement in operational restructuring, as the bankruptcy laws may
be understood as forcing states to submit to federal control in exchange for
obtaining the benefit of debt relief.328 The anti-commandeering principle has
been applied not only to prohibit Congress from compelling state govern-
ments to participate in federal regulatory programs, but also to prohibit Con-
gress from using its spending power to coerce states to enact federal
regulatory programs.3 29 A principal justification for this concern is that of
political accountability, as federal coercion may obfuscate the decision-mak-
ing process and confuse the electorate.33 0
324 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 566-67 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting).
325 28 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). This non-Article III status may raise important questions of
bankruptcy courts' constitutional authority to enter final judgments in their potential role in
restructuring municipal governance. See Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011)
(holding that bankruptcy courts lack the constitutional authority to determine state law coun-
terclaims). However, this article leaves such Stern matters to the side.
321 See Johnson & Young, supra note 323, at 159 n.205.
121 Congress's removal power is currently limited by statute, which permits removal only
"when a vacancy exists by reason of resignation, retirement, removal, or death." 28 U.S.C.
§ 152(b)(3) (2012). Only judges in the judicial council where the bankruptcy court is located
may remove a bankruptcy judge, and "only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or
physical or mental disability." 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2012).
328 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1208; see also Johnson & Young, supra note 323, at
140 (analyzing the constitutional problems of conditioning state bailouts on "demands that a
state alter its constitution"). Of course, a bankruptcy is not a bailout, as Johnson and Young
recognize. But the concerns they identify are analogous to that of conditioning debt relief on
alternations to local governance.
329 See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992) ("'[T]he Constitution simply does not give Congress
the authority to require the States to regulate. That is true whether Congress directly com-
mands a State to regulate or indirectly coerces a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as
its own.'"); see also Coan, supra note 317, at 3 (summarizing Sebelius as holding that "coer-
cive exercises of the conditional spending power and commandeering amount to the same
thing").
330 See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2578.
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Municipal bankruptcy laws do not offer federal funds; they offer a dis-
charge of indebtedness that is unavailable under state law. In effect, as Mc-
Connell describes it, municipal bankruptcy law may be understood as "the
Federal government lending to cities and states its power to impair contracts,
a power otherwise reserved under the Constitution for the Federal govern-
ment."331 If that discharge is offered on the condition that states raise taxes,
restructure their local governments, or take other mandated steps of opera-
tional reorganization, this is very much like conditional spending.332 The
question, then, is whether that condition raises political accountability
problems.
The current system of judicial control "by a wink and a nod" may pre-
sent serious concerns on this front. When the federal government makes
conditions, it must do so explicitly.333 It is not clear that the municipal bank-
ruptcy laws now do that sufficiently well. In fact, facially, the statutory safe-
guards of Sections 903 and 904 appear to prevent federal intrusion into local
governance at all. It is only through indirect and under the radar procedural
devices that courts can intrude upon local governance.334 This indirect con-
trol seems particularly problematic from the standpoint of political accounta-
bility. In fact, as Levitin argues, the ability of courts to do just this may be
deliberately designed to obfuscate the decision-making process for politi-
cally unpopular decisions, such as how to treat public pension plans.33 5 In
this sense, public pension reform is similar to finding a site for nuclear waste
disposal: it's something that needs to be done, but preferably by someone
else.
Even if Congress amended the municipal bankruptcy laws to be more
explicit as to these conditions, it is not clear that this would solve the prob-
lem. As Gillette and Skeel acknowledge, "[T]he right of a state to deter-
mine the governance structure of its cities could be seen, in a sense, as
inalienable."36 The Court has reiterated this concern-expressed in Ashton
through New York-that the states may not expand the powers given to Con-
gress.337 And even when conditions are stated unambiguously, there may be
serious concerns of political accountability, as states would be delegating
unpopular decisions to a federal court.
"' Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States, in WHEN STATES Go
BROKE 233 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr., eds., 2012) (describing this as a way of
understanding the theory behind Bekins, a theory he ultimately rejects because bankruptcy law
gives significant, indirect control to bankruptcy courts over local governance).
112 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1209.
. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006)
("Congress has broad power to set the terms on which it disburses federal money to the States,
but when Congress attaches conditions to a State's acceptance of federal funds, the conditions
must be set out unambiguously.") (internal citations and quotations omitted).
334 See Jacoby, supra note 24; McConnell & Picker, supra note 23.
335 Levitin, supra note 2.
336 Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1215.
.' See generally Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
86 [Vol. 11
Beyond the Great Divide
Gillette and Skeel ultimately argue that the consensual nature of munic-
ipal bankruptcy should assuage these anti-commandeering concerns because
states have the right to opt out of the municipal bankruptcy laws, the condi-
tional discharge would be more voluntary than was the conditional Medicaid
funding in NFIB.3 3 8 While this seems correct, the central role they assign to
consent will always appear problematic in the absence of a decisive break
with the Great Divide Model and the move to a more functionalist model,
which better accommodates analysis of what constitutes consent. Nothing
better illustrates the need for this break than the Court's approach in the
Puerto Rico litigation.
2. State Consent and the Puerto Rico Litigation
The Puerto Rico litigation is, in some respects, a strange place to look
for analyzing the role of state consent. Puerto Rico is not a state but a com-
monwealth, whose relationship with the United States is entirely unique.3 9
This litigation, though, serves to illustrate how the Great Divide Model may
aggrandize federal control over municipal financial restructuring in a way
that, if applied to the states (as the Court suggests), might undermine the
validity of state consent. The question in Puerto Rico v. Franklin, as dis-
cussed supra, was whether Puerto Rico's Recovery Act-which would pro-
vide a bankruptcy-like procedure for Puerto Rican public corporations-was
preempted by the Bankruptcy Code. Puerto Rican municipalities and public
corporations are excluded from relief under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code, leaving open the question whether Puerto Rico could fill this gap or
whether Puerto Rico was stuck without a solution to its public debt crisis.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, held that Section 903(1)
preempts the Recovery Act.3 40 He reasoned that the language of Section
903(1) applies to all "states," and the Bankruptcy Code defines "state" to
include Puerto Rico (except for determining whether Puerto Rico was eligi-
ble to be a debtor). As such, he broadly stated that Section 903(1) would
preempt all "state municipal bankruptcy laws," regardless of whether a state
had opted into the municipal bankruptcy option. That is, even those twenty-
six states that have not opted into Chapter 9 (as well as Puerto Rico and
Washington, D.C., which are statutorily excluded from Chapter 9 relief)
could no longer enforce their own municipal bankruptcy laws.3 4 1
This broad preemption is consistent with the legislative history of Sec-
tion 903(1). However, it raises important questions of the importance of state
consent. In Faitoute, the Court considered a similar issue as applied to a
New Jersey statute and concluded that Congress did not intend to preempt
. Gillette & Skeel, supra note 6, at 1215.
. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863, 1868 (2016) (describing the
"unique political relationship" between the United States and Puerto Rico).
34() See Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1944 (2016).
341 See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 7.
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state financial rescue laws.3 42 That opinion could be read as assuming that
this decision reflected a simple policy choice to not preempt state laws. In
that case, the subsequent amendment preempting state composition laws
would be a valid exercise of congressional authority. That opinion, though,
suggests this was not a policy choice to leave state laws intact but rather a
belief that preemption would upset the delicate constitutional balance Con-
gress had struck in crafting the municipal bankruptcy laws. Taking away the
state option, that is, might upset the balance of federal and state power.
The Court, though, did not consider this question at all in the Puerto
Rico litigation. It simply concluded that Section 903(1) could preempt all
state composition laws, regardless of whether a state had opted into the mu-
nicipal bankruptcy laws. By not considering this issue at all, the case could
read as suggesting that municipal bankruptcy law does not need an "opt in"
feature. If Congress can displace state control over municipal insolvency
even without state consent, perhaps state consent is not so important after
all.
Such a broad reading is consistent with the Great Divide Model, as it
would place municipal bankruptcy laws within the federal sphere of power,
thus vitiating the need for state consent of any kind. Such a reading, though,
is inconsistent with the history and development of the municipal bank-
ruptcy laws, which have consistently treated state consent as an essential
feature of municipal bankruptcy law. It also would place a great deal of
weight on a case in which those consent issues were arguably absent, given
that Puerto Rico's status as a territory would not have raised state sover-
eignty concerns.3 43
When municipal bankruptcy law is understood as a more cooperative
regime, one that intends to preserve the states' control over local governance
while respecting the federal power to pass uniform bankruptcy laws, the im-
portance of state consent is obvious: there can be no cooperation without
state consent. A broad reading of Justice Thomas's decision, therefore, would
drastically and problematically alter federal-state relations in this field. As to
states that have not authorized a municipal bankruptcy filing, this interpreta-
tion of Section 903 would effectively expand the Contracts Clause. Cities
like Pontiac that are trying to address financial distress would face federal
restraints not only under the Contracts Clause but also under the bankruptcy
laws. States would thus lose the ability to regulate under any law that would
fit under the banner of a "municipal bankruptcy law." Such a result would
lump together operational and financial restructuring laws in a way that is
inconsistent with the statutory structure of Chapter 9 and upend its underly-
ing constitutional foundation.
This narrower reading is consistent not only with the structure of Sec-
tions 903 and 904, but it also comports with the notion of state consent more
342 See Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 507 (1942).
343 See Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr. v. Puerto Rico, 805 F.3d 322, 344-45 (1st Cir. 2015)
(identifying, but avoiding, this issue on the grounds that Puerto Rico's territorial status does
not implicate the Tenth Amendment), affd, 136 S. Ct. 1938 (2016).
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broadly. As Justice Frankfurter recognized in Faitoute, "[T]he bankruptcy
power is exercised . . . only in a case where the action of the taxing agency
in carrying out a plan of composition approved by the bankruptcy court is
authorized by state law." 344 Thus, bankruptcy law does not come into play
unless and until the state has authorized the municipality to seek bankruptcy
relief. This result was not policy driven; rather, it was "carefully drawn so as
not to impinge on the sovereignty of the State."3 45
This approach also avoids the larger constitutional anti-commandeering
concerns that would arise if state consent were eroded. If Congress could
strip states of their ability to address municipal insolvency, then the states'
"consent" to the federal bankruptcy laws looks much more like coercion. It
would also undermine the political safeguards against federal intrusion, as it
would effectively force states to use bankruptcy to address municipal insol-
vency. By limiting states from addressing municipal insolvency on their
own, Congress is effectively forcing states to "consent" to the bankruptcy
option.346 That is, by taking away a state's ability to address municipal insol-
vency on its own, Congress is pushing states towards the federal bankruptcy
option, thus undermining state consent.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has argued that municipal bankruptcy federalism has unhap-
pily been stuck in the language and framework of an outdated model of
federalism. When faced with questions of federal interaction with state law,
that model presumes independent regulatory spheres of federal and state
power-debt regulation belongs to the federal, operational regulation to the
states. It has then identified three problems with this Great Divide Model.
First, its formalist nature obscures the decision-making process, particularly
as applied to matters where debt and governance overlap. Second, it fails to
provide useful guidance to courts on how to balance the state and federal
interests in municipal insolvency. And third, the Great Divide Model creates
a distance between municipal bankruptcy federalism and general principles
of federalism-resulting in a schema that is incapable of identifying and
analyzing the more complex relationship between federal and state govern-
ments in the context of municipal insolvency.
Accordingly, this article has argued for a shift towards a more function-
alist approach to municipal bankruptcy federalism-an approach that takes
into account the purposes and goals of municipal bankruptcy, recognizing
the interest of the state. Such a functional approach creates an analytical
framework for defining the role of states to reorganize their distressed mu-
nicipalities. Furthermore, and perhaps even more importantly, it creates tools
344 316 U.S. at 1132.
345 Id.
346 Cf Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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for imposing limits on the reach of federal bankruptcy courts into the opera-
tional arena of distressed municipalities.
